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Abstract
In this paper, an explicit micro scenario is developed which yields a well-
defined aggregate job matching function. In particular, a stochastic model
of job-matching behavior is constructed in which the system steady state
is shown to be approximated by an exponential-type matching function,
as the population becomes large. This steady-state approximation is first
derived for fixed levels of both wages and search intensities, where it is
shown (without using a free-entry condition) that there exists a unique
equilibrium. It is then shown that if job searchers are allowed to choose their
search intensities optimally, this model is again consistent with a unique
steady state. Finally, the assumption of a fixed wage is relaxed, and an
optimal ‘offer wage’ is derived for employers.
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1. Introduction
In the last few years, the vision of the labor market has changed from a stock
perspective to a flow perspective. Indeed, labor markets in both the United States
and Europe are characterized by very important gross flows that are associated
with high rates of job creation and job destruction (Blanchard and Diamond,
1989, Burda and Wyploz, 1994, Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996). Because of
these large flows, the labor market cannot perfectly match workers and jobs, so
that vacant jobs and unemployed workers coexist.
Mortensen and Pissarides were the first to develop a unified theoretical frame-
work for analyzing this complex matching process, involving mutual search by
workers and firms (for a synthesis, see Pissarides, 1990, and Mortensen and Pis-
sarides, 1999). This has become widely known as the Mortensen-Pissarides model
(MP hereafter). A central feature of their analysis is the aggregate matching func-
tion which combines job vacancies and unemployed workers to yield new active
jobs. As pointed out by Pissarides (1990) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989),
this notion of a matching function hides a complex reality in which skill differences
between workers and jobs have a major role to play.
In the present paper, there is assumed to exist a fixed population of workers
with heterogeneous skills. Firms are similarly characterized by a flow of het-
erogeneous production possibilities, with newly profitable jobs being opened and
unprofitable jobs being closed. Thus job matching is taken to constitute a process
whereby heterogeneous workers compete for jobs with different skill requirements.
Here heterogeneity of workers need not imply any superiority or inferiority among
their abilities. Rather, all are assumed to possess the same level of general human
capital, which is manifested in a variety of different skills (as for example college
graduates with degrees in different fields).1
In this context, our first objective is to derive an explicit micro scenario that
leads to a well-defined job matching function. This scenario involves a day-to-day
process in which currently vacant jobs are posted by firms, and currently active
job seekers apply for these vacancies. A vacancy is filled on a given day if and
only if from among all those currently active job seekers, at least one applies for
the position who meets all the job requirements. From these conditions one may
1This approach to modeling heterogeneity on both sides of the labor market is similar to that
of Hamilton, Thisse and Zenou (1999) and to Sattinger (1993), although they focus on different
issues since, in particular, there is no search in their analysis.
2
derive an explicit job-filling probability on any given day.2 The corresponding daily
matching function is then given by the product of this probability and the expected
number of vacant jobs per worker on each day. When the population of workers
is allowed to become large, it is shown (Section 2) that the asymptotic form of
this matching function is of exponential type and has the standard properties, i.e.,
is concave, monotone increasing in both arguments, and homogeneous of degree
one. However, a comparison of this matching function with its finite-population
counterpart reveals that while the latter is also increasing and concave, it fails to
be linearly homogeneous. Hence in the present case, linear homogeneity turns out
to be more a property of limits than of the underlying behavioral process.
This exponential-type matching function (which is essentially a limiting form
of the classical ‘urn model’ in discrete probability theory) was first employed in
a market context by Butters (1977) to model contacts between buyers and sellers
in commodity markets. The first application of this model to job matching was
by Hall (1979). The present application is however most closely related to that of
Blanchard and Diamond (1993, 1994), who developed a continuous-time version
of the job-matching process. Our specific model can be most accurately described
as a variation of the discrete-time model developed by Blanchard and Diamond
(1993, Appendix A) for their numerical simulations. The key difference between
this discrete-time model (BD hereafter) and ours is largely one of focus. BD is
concerned with firm hiring behavior, and in particular, the effect of unemployment
duration on hiring probabilities. Hence firms are assumed to have private informa-
tion about the unemployment duration of jobs applicants, and to rank applicants
on this basis. In the present paper, the focus is more on job-seeking behavior,
and in particular the decision process by which unemployed workers choose their
intensity (frequency) of job search. This decision process in turn requires a more
explicit consideration of the actual matching between applicants and jobs.3
Given this micro-based matching function, we begin with a simple stochastic
model of the labor market (section 2) in which both wage levels and search in-
tensities are assumed to be given. Here the focus is primarily on the steady-state
behavior arising from the interaction of a finite population of workers with a flow
of job opportunities linked by this matching function. This model departs from
2Equivalently, one may also determine the job-hiring probability that a job seeker is employed
on a given day.
3In particular, the overall job ‘application rate’ in BD is here modeled more explicitly to
include both an expected ‘search intensity level’ for job seekers, and a ‘qualification probability’
for job applicants.
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both the BD model and MP model in terms of the basic flow of job creations
and destructions. Such flows are here modeled as a type of stochastic birth-death
process in which profitable jobs are ‘born’ and unprofitable jobs ‘die’ at rates
depending on the overall state of the economy. In BD it is assumed rather that
there exists a fixed stock of potentially productive jobs which continually switch
between ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ states, depending on the economy. A
steady state in both these models then involves a balancing of this job flow with
the alternating flow of workers between employment and unemployment. In con-
trast, such a balance is achieved in MP by assuming a ‘free entry’ condition in
which firms continue to create new job vacancies until the expected gains from
advertising new jobs fall to zero. But while this condition is quite natural within
a given industry where jobs are similar in nature, it is more difficult to interpret in
a stochastic environment where individual job creations and closings are treated
as essentially independent events.4
As in both the MP and BD models, we then show that when the popula-
tion of workers becomes large, there exists a unique steady-state for this labor
market characterized by the mean job-vacancy rate and unemployment rate.5 In
particular, the steady-state unemployment rate is shown to be positive. Hence
the imperfect nature of this job-matching process always gives rise to permanent
frictional unemployment regardless of how man jobs are available.
Given this basic steady-state model, our second objective is to relax the as-
sumption of fixed search intensities, and to derive an explicit optimal search
intensity level for unemployed workers. In particular, we focus on the utility-
maximizing problem of an unemployed worker in deciding how much time to
spend in job search (i.e., how many days per week to actively search for a job).
Here it is shown (section 3) that the optimal strategy is to search up to the point
where the marginal gain of additional search (in terms of decreased unemployment
4In particular, if jobs are similar in nature, then changes in the economy will tend to affect
all jobs alike. Thus, in this context, it is more difficult to support the usual assumption that
individual job openings and closings are independent ‘Poisson’ events.
5In both the MP and BD models, this argument is implicitly made by passing directly to the
limit. For example, the BD model involves a system of deterministic difference equations which
represent the transitions in mean unemployment and job vacancy levels from week to week. Here
we begin with the actual stochastic steady states for each finite population size, and show that
(under mild conditions) the corresponding steady-state unemployment and job-vacancy rates
converge in probability to their mean values as the population size becomes large. This provides
an explicit probabilistic foundation for the resulting steady-state equations in terms of mean
unemployment and job-vacancy rates.
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duration) equals its marginal cost (in terms of reduced leisure). We then show
that this behavior is consistent with the steady-state model above in the sense
that there now exists a unique steady state equilibrium with endogenous search.
Given these endogenous search intensity levels for unemployed workers, our
final objective is to derive an optimal wage level for firms which maximizes their
expected profit stream. In the standard search and job matching literature (such
as MP and BD), it is generally assumed that wages are set according to strategic
bilateral Nash bargaining. Mortensen (1989) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
have surveyed the range of alternative wage-determination models in a search
framework. Aside from the Nash bargaining model, they describe different wage
setting rules including the ‘market clearing’ wage (wage equals unemployment
benefit), the ‘insider-outsider’ wage, and the ‘efficiency’ wage. In the present
paper, we propose a Stackelberg setting in which wages set by firms are viewed
as ‘signals’ to workers in choosing their optimal search intensities. Firms face the
following trade off in setting wages: If wages are set too low then search intensities
will also be low, so that jobs will tend to remain vacant for long periods with no
profits earned. On the other hand, if wages are set too high, then only small
profits will be earned while jobs are active.6 In this context we show (section 4)
that an optimal wage level always exists, and in addition that if optimal wages
are ‘sufficiently large’ then they must be unique.
2. The Basic Model
Consider a population of N workers who compete for jobs in a given labor market.
All jobs are offered at the same prevailing daily wage, w, but are assumed to
be completely specialized in terms of skill requirements.7 Similarly, workers are
assumed to be heterogeneous in terms of their skill endowments. As stated in the
introduction, job matching in the present context constitutes a process whereby
heterogeneous workers allocate themselves to jobs with different skill requirements.
6This model of wage determination is somewhat similar to that of Sattinger (1990), where
firms face a trade off between the wage they pay and the ratio of job seekers to vacancies.
Here high wages imply more interviews and thus a lower duration for vacancies but, of course,
at a higher cost. However, the central focus of this framework is very different since the goal
is to find an efficient wage in a standard macroeconomic matching framework, whereas ours
is to determine an equilibrium wage in a stochastic matching model with endogenous search
intensities.
7The assumption of completely specialized jobs can also be found in Pissarides (1990) and
Blanchard and Diamond (1994).
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Heterogeneity of workers does not here imply any superiority or inferiority among
their abilities. Rather, all are assumed to possess the same level of general human
capital, which is manifested in a variety of different skills. Hence all workers are
assumed to have the same chance of being qualified for any given job, as modeled
by a common qualification probability, γ .
In this context, the actual job matching process can be described as follows.
At any point in time, each worker is either employed or unemployed, and only
unemployed workers are assumed to search for jobs. Since individual jobs are
completely specialized, their creation and closing can be regarded as independent
events. In particular, job creations and job closings are here modeled as a sim-
ple birth-death process in which ‘births’ are governed by a job-creation rate, β
(denoting the mean number of jobs per worker created each day) and ‘deaths’
are governed by a job-closure rate, ρ (denoting the probability that any currently
existing job will be closed on a given day). This process is taken to depend on
the general state of economy, and hence is treated as exogenous to the labor mar-
ket. Two basic parameters in the model are initially taken to be given: the daily
wage, w, and the search intensity, s,which denotes the expected fraction of days
on which each unemployed worker actively seeks a job. The following is a brief
description of the behavioral day-to-day scenario for the job market model on a
given day, t :
• At the beginning of day t those unemployed workers currently seeking work
appear at the job market. All current job vacancies are posted, and are
offered at the going wage w. Each searcher applies for a single job. No
additional prior information about jobs is available, and there is no com-
munication between searchers. Hence searchers choose jobs at random, and
more than one searcher may apply for the same job.
• As mentioned above, each job applicant has the same probability, γ, of
satisfying all qualifications for the given job. If more than one applicant is
qualified for a job, the employer chooses a qualified applicant at random.
Otherwise the job is not filled on day t.
• At the end of day t each successful applicant is notified, and is requested
to start work on the following day. In addition, decisions are made by
employers as to which jobs are no longer profitable and should be closed.
For currently active jobs which are closed, layoff notices are distributed
to workers. Moreover, for jobs which are filled that day and then closed,
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the successful (but unlucky) applicants are also given notices. Finally, those
currently vacant jobs which are closed are simply removed from the postings
at the beginning of the next day. As mentioned above, all jobs (active or
vacant) have the same chance, ρ, of being closed on day t.
• In addition, those new job opportunities which have arisen during the day
(at rate, β, per worker) are added to the vacant job postings for the next
day.
This process is governed by the following system of accounting equations:
V Nt+1 =
Beginning
of Day tz}|{
V Nt +
Endof
Day tz }| {
(BNt − FNt − CNvt ) (2.1)
UNt+1 = U
N
t +
¡
CNat − FNt
¢
(2.2)
Here the random variables, V Nt and U
N
t , denote respectively the numbers of job
vacancies and unemployed workers at the beginning of day t. Variable FNt denotes
the number of vacant jobs filled by the end of day t. Variables CNvt and C
N
at denote
respectively the numbers of vacant jobs closed and active jobs closed at the end
of day t (removed from the postings on day t+ 1). Finally, variable BNt denotes
the number of new job openings announced at the end of day t. (The reason for
the population superscript N will become clear later). Equation (2.1) then states
that the change in total vacant jobs from day t to t+ 1 is given by the difference
between the new jobs created and the vacant jobs either filled or closed on day t.
Similarly, equation (2.2) states that the change in unemployment from day t to
t + 1 is given by the difference between the number of workers laid off (i.e., the
number of active jobs closed) and the number of workers hired (i.e., the number
of vacant jobs filled) on day t.
2.1. Job Matching Process
Within this overall accounting framework, we now focus on the key variables, FNt ,
which summarize job hiring activity on each day. To do so, we begin by fixing the
number of vacant jobs and unemployed workers, say V Nt = m and U
N
t = n (where
7
it is assumed that there is at least one vacant job, i.e. m ≥ 1). In this context, if
for each vacant job, j = 1, . . . ,m, we define the indicator variable
F jt =
½
1 , if job j is filled on day t
0 , otherwise
(2.3)
then by definition, the conditional value of FNt given m is of the form
FNt =
mX
j=1
F jt . (2.4)
Hence to model FNt we begin by considering the conditional distribution of each
F jt given V
N
t = m and U
N
t = n. To do so, recall first that not all unemployed
workers necessarily seek work on any given day. Rather, there is a probability
(search intensity), s, that any worker chooses to search on day t. Hence, assuming
independent decision behavior by all individuals, the probability that l (≤ n)
individuals apply for jobs on day t is given by the binomial probability:
P (l|n) =
µ
n
l
¶
sl(1− s)n−l . (2.5)
Next, recalling that jobs are chosen at random by applicants, the chance that any
worker applies for job j is given by 1/m. Hence the chance of k (≤ l) applicants
for job j is given by
Pm(k|l) =
µ
l
k
¶µ
1
m
¶kµ
1− 1
m
¶l−k
, (2.6)
A straightforward calculation (see section A.1 of the Appendix) then shows that
the probability of k applicants given m and n is of the form:
P (k|m,n) =
µ
n
k
¶µ
s
m
¶k ³
1− s
m
´n−k
(2.7)
Finally, recalling that workers are qualified for any given job with probability, γ,
and that a job is filled only if at least one qualified worker applies, it follows that
the probability of filling job j given k applicants is
P
¡
F jt = 1|k
¢
= 1− (1− γ)k . (2.8)
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Hence, combining (2.7) and (2.8), we have
P
¡
F jt = 1|m,n
¢
=
nX
k=0
P
¡
F jt = 1|k
¢
P (k|m,n)
=
nX
k=0
h
1− (1− γ)k
iµn
k
¶µ
s
m
¶k ³
1− s
m
´n−k
= 1−
nX
k=0
(1− γ)k
µ
n
k
¶µ
s
m
¶k ³
1− s
m
´n−k
. (2.9)
But recalling that the moment generating function of the binomial, B(p, n), is of
the form, E
¡
θK
¢
= (1− p+ θp)n, it follows that
P
¡
F jt = 1|m,n
¢
= 1−E
h
(1− γ)K
i
= 1−
³
1− s
m
+ (1− γ) s
m
´n
= 1−
³
1− γs
m
´n
. (2.10)
Finally, observing that this probability is precisely the conditional mean, E(F jt |m,n),
of the random variable F jt , it follows from (2.4) that the expected total number
of jobs filled on any day for which there are m vacant jobs and n unemployed
workers is given by
E(FNt |m,n) =
mX
j=1
E(F jt |m,n) = m
h
1−
³
1− γs
m
´ni
(2.11)
The function ΦN defined by the right hand side, i.e. by
ΦN (m,n) = m
h
1−
³
1− γs
m
´ni
(2.12)
is thus seen to summarize the key workings of this job market, and is designated
as the matching function for the system.
By employing arguments similar to those above, one can in principle analyze
the day-to-day stochastic behavior of this finite-population system. In particular,
one may determine the explicit form of the discrete conditional distribution of FNt
9
given
¡
V Nt = m,U
N
t = n
¢
8. This, together with the properties of the (discrete-
time) birth-death model for job creations and closings, allows one to determine
the conditional distribution of
¡
V Nt+1, U
N
t+1
¢
given
¡
V Nt , U
N
t
¢
[by employing the ba-
sic accounting equations (2.1) and (2.2)]. For our present purposes, it suffices to
observe that the Markov chain defined by these conditional distributions is neces-
sarily both positive recurrent and acyclic, so that for each population size N this
process converges to a unique steady-state distribution [as for example in Kulkarni
(1995, Theorem 5.3.15)].
While the exact form of this steady-state distribution can be exceedingly com-
plex for small N , it turns out that under fairly mild conditions, this distribution
concentrates in the neighborhood of its mean as N becomes large.9 Hence, fol-
lowing the standard approach adopted in most of the literature, we henceforth
assume that the system is in steady state, and that N is sufficiently large to allow
steady-state fluctuations in both unemployment levels job vacancies per worker
to be ignored. We now develop this nonstochastic approximation for large N .
2.2. Mean Steady-State Relations
If the system is in steady state, then the mean values of all random variables
in (2.1) and (2.2) are constant over time. Hence, letting
¡
V N , UN , FN , CNa , C
N
v
¢
,
denote the steady-steady counterparts of the random variables in these two equa-
tions, it then follows that E
¡
V Nt
¢
= E
¡
V N
¢
for all t, and similarly for all other
random variables. By replacing all random variables in (2.1) and (2.2) with their
steady-state counterparts and taking expectations, we obtain the following (re-
duced) steady-state relations:
E
¡
FN
¢
+E
¡
CNv
¢
= E
¡
BN
¢
(2.13)
E
¡
FN
¢
= E
¡
CNa
¢
(2.14)
Recall next from the basic model description that each of the
¡
V N − FN¢ vacant
jobs remaining at the end of the day has the same chance, ρ, of being closed
(removed from the job postings), so that the expected number E
¡
CNv
¢
of vacant
8The case of V Nt = 0 must be treated separately. By our assumptions, it follows that
P
¡
FNt = 0 = C
N
vt |V Nt = 0
¢
= 1. Hence P
¡
V Nt+1 = m|V Nt = 0
¢
= P
¡
BNt = m|V Nt = 0
¢
=
P
¡
BNt = m
¢
and P
¡
UNt+1 = n|V Nt = 0, UNt + CNat = n
¢
= 1.
9See for example the results of Brumelle and Gerchak (1980).
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jobs closed is given by:
E
¡
CNv
¢
=
X
k
E
¡
CNv |V N − FN = k
¢
P
¡
V N − FN = k¢
=
X
k
(ρ k)P
¡
V N − FN = k¢
= ρE
¡
V N − FN¢ = ρ £E ¡V N¢−E ¡FN¢¤ (2.15)
Similarly, each active job has the same chance, ρ, of being closed. But since active
jobs include both those jobs active at the beginning of the day and those filled that
day, the number of active jobs is identical to the number of currently employed
workers, N − UN , plus the number of vacancies filled, FN . Hence it follows from
the same argument as in (2.15) that the expected number, E
¡
CNa
¢
, of vacant jobs
closed is given by:
E
¡
CNa
¢
= ρ
£
N −E ¡UN¢+E ¡FN¢¤ (2.16)
Finally, by substituting (2.15) and (2.16) into (2.13) and (2.14) and rearranging
terms, we may conclude that in the steady state:
(1− ρ)E ¡FN¢+ ρE ¡V N¢ = E ¡BN¢ (2.17)
(1− ρ)E ¡FN¢ = ρ £N −E ¡UN¢¤ (2.18)
2.3. Large Population Approximations
Given this reduced system of relations, we next ask how the steady-state distrib-
utions of
¡
BN , UN , V N , FN
¢
behave as the population N becomes large. Each of
these random variables will be considered in order.
2.3.1. Job Creation Rate.
It should be clear from the basic model described above that this economy is
largely driven by the creation of new job opportunities. Moreover, it was implicitly
assumed that the per-worker rate of job-creation, β, is independent of population
size. In other words, increments in population (and hence in potential demand for
goods and services) are assumed to generate proportional increments in mean job
creations. This can be modeled formally by assuming that for each individual i
there is a random variable, Bi , representing the daily jobs created by the presence
11
of i in the economy. This convention allows the total number of jobs created to
be represented as a sum
BN =
NX
i=1
Bi (2.19)
If it then assumed that these individual contributions are independently and iden-
tically distributed, with mean β and finite variance σ2, then by the Weak Law of
Large Numbers it follows that BN/N converges to β in probability, i.e., that
plimN→∞
BN
N
= β (2.20)
Hence for large populations the daily rate of job creation per-worker can be treated
as nonstochastic.10
2.3.2. Unemployment Rate
A similar argument can be made for the steady-state unemployment level in the
economy. In particular, if the unemployment status of each worker i is represented
by a random (indicator) variable, Ui (with Ui = 1 when i is unemployed and Ui = 0
otherwise), then the daily level of unemployment can be represented as in (2.19)
by
UN =
NX
i=1
Ui (2.21)
Hence if large populations of workers are treated as homogeneous collections of in-
dependent behaving units, then these employment status variables can be treated
as independently and identically distributed with common mean, u [and finite
variance u (1− u)]. It then follows, as in (2.20), that
plimN→∞
UN
N
= u (2.22)
and thus that for large populations the steady-state unemployment rate, u, can
also be regarded as nonstochastic.11
10Note that our assumptions imply strong convergence in (2.20), i.e. that BN/N converges
almost surely to β. But since weak convergence ensures the validity of nonstochastic approxi-
mations for any (sufficiently large) fixed population size, N , this suffices for our purposes.
11The assumption of statistically independent worker behavior can be relaxed to some degree.
For example, if workers communicate only with a boundedly finite set of other workers, then
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2.3.3. Job Vacancy rate
These nonstochastic approximations in turn imply that the steady-state job va-
cancy rate can be treated as nonstochastic. In particular, if the random variable
JN represents total jobs in steady state, so that by definition,
JN = V N +
¡
N − UN¢ (2.23)
it is then shown in section A.2 of the Appendix that our assumptions imply
plimN→∞
JN
N
= limN→∞
E
¡
JN
¢
N
=
β
ρ
. (2.24)
Thus, by dividing through (2.23) and taking probability limits, we may conclude
that
plimN→∞
JN
N
= plimN→∞
µ
V N
N
+ 1− U
N
N
¶
⇒ β
ρ
= plimN→∞
V N
N
+ (1− u)
⇒ plimN→∞
V N
N
=
β
ρ
− (1− u) (2.25)
Hence the steady-state job vacancy rate, v, can also be treated as nonstochastic
for large N , and is seen to be given by
v = u+ a (2.26)
where
a =
β
ρ
− 1 (2.27)
a simple application of Chebyshev’s Inequality shows that (2.22) still holds. More generally,
the same arguments show that it is enough to require that the average (absolute) correlation,
(1/N)
P
j 6=i ρij , of each worker i’s unemployment status with all other workers eventually vanish
[see for example the proof of Theorem 4.4.2 of Renyi (1970)]. Similar (but more stringent)
conditions for almost sure convergence can be found in Stout (1974, section 3.7).
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2.3.4. Vacancy Filling Rate
Finally, these results taken together also imply that the steady-state rate at which
vacant jobs are filled can also be treated as nonstochastic. To see this, observe
first that if for each x, y,N we let
pN (x, y) = 1−
µ
1− γs
Ny
¶Nx
(2.28)
then the job-filling probability in (2.10) can be rewritten as follows:
P
¡
F jt = 1
¯̄
n,m
¢
= 1−
³
1− γs
m
´n
= 1−
Ã
1− γs
N
¡
m
N
¢!N( nN )
= pN
³ n
N
,
m
N
´
(2.29)
In terms of this notation, observe next from (2.4) that the total number, FN ,
of job vacancies filled must then be conditionally binomially distributed given
V N = m and UN = n, with mean
E
¡
FN |n,m¢ = pN ³ n
N
,
m
N
´
·m (2.30)
Hence, the conditional expectation of the vacancy-filling rate, FN/N , is
E
µ
FN
N
¯̄̄̄
n,m
¶
= pN
³ n
N
,
m
N
´
· m
N
(2.31)
and it follows that the unconditional mean of FN/N is given by
E
µ
FN
N
¶
= EUN ,V N
·
pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
¸
(2.32)
But if we now let
p (x, y) = 1− e−(γsx/y) (2.33)
14
and observe that
limN→∞ pN (x, y) = limN→∞
(
1−
"µ
1− γs
Ny
¶N#x)
= 1−
"
limN→∞
µ
1− γs
Ny
¶N#x
= 1− £e−(γs/y)¤x
= p (x, y) (2.34)
it can then be shown (see section A.3 of the Appendix) that this limiting relation,
together with the probability limits in (2.22) and (2.26) imply that
plimN→∞
FN
N
= limN→∞E
µ
FN
N
¶
= limN→∞EUN ,V N
·
pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
¸
= p(u, v) · v
= v
£
1− e−(γsu/v)¤ . (2.35)
If the steady-state vacancy-filling rate, f , for the system is defined by
f = plimN→∞
FN
N
, (2.36)
then it follows from (2.35) that f is related to v and u by
f = φ(u, v) = v
£
1− e−(γsu/v)¤ . (2.37)
The function, φ, is seen to be precisely the asymptotic (normalized) form of the
functions, ΦN , defined in (2.12) above, and hence is again designated as the
matching function for the system. Notice also from (2.29) and (2.34) that the
quantity
pf(u, v) = 1− e−(γsu/v) (2.38)
can be interpreted as the asymptotic job-filling probability for the system (i.e. the
asymptotic probability that any given vacant job will be filled on a given day).
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Finally we note that while the above analysis was developed in terms of job-
filling probabilities, all results could equivalently have been formulated in terms
of hiring probabilities. This follows from the obvious accounting identity between
the number of jobs filled and the number of workers hired on any given day. For
our later purposes, it will be convenient to treat the asymptotic hiring probability
as well. This can be derived from the above results as follows. Observe first
that, as a parallel to V N and pN
¡
n
N
, m
N
¢
, we may let HN denote the number
of job searchers hired on any day for population N , and let qN
¡
n
N
, m
N
¢
denote
the conditional probability that any given job searcher is hired on a day with n
unemployed workers and m vacant jobs. Then, observing that by definition the
expected number of job searchers on any day given n is simply s ·n, it follows that
the above accounting identity takes the form:
E
¡
FN |n,m¢ ≡ E ¡HN |n,m¢
⇒ E
µ
FN
N
|n,m
¶
≡ E
µ
HN
N
|n,m
¶
⇒ pN
³ n
N
,
m
N
´
· m
N
≡ qN
³ n
N
,
m
N
´
· s · n
N
⇒ pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
· V
N
N
≡ qN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
· s · U
N
N
(2.39)
Hence, taking probability limits on both sides and applying the results above, we
see that
p (v, u) · v =
½
plimN→∞ qN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶¾
· s · u
⇒ plimN→∞ qN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
=
v
s u
· p (u, v) (2.40)
Finally, denoting the desired asymptotic hiring probability for the system by
ph (u, v) = plimN→∞ qN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
(2.41)
it follows from (2.35) that
ph (u, v) =
v
s u
£
1− e−(γsu/v)¤ . (2.42)
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2.4. Properties of the Matching Function
Before determining the steady state values of u and v, it is of interest to consider
the matching function (2.37) in more detail. First, we show that φ is an instance
of the general class of matching functions proposed by Pissarides (1990), i.e. that
(see section A.4 of the Appendix for the proof):
Proposition 2.1. The function, φ, in (2.37) is concave, linearly homogeneous,
and monotone increasing in both arguments.
Additional insight can be gained by employing the concept of labor market
tightness, defined in Pissarides (1990) as θ ≡ v
su
. Our job-filling probability (2.38)
can be written in terms of θ as:
pf (u, v) ≡ q(θ) = 1− e−γ/θ (2.43)
with associated hiring probability (2.42) given by:
ph (u, v) ≡ θq(θ) = θ
£
1− e−γ/θ¤ (2.44)
For 0 < θ < ∞, it is easily verified that (i) q0(θ) < 0, (ii) the elasticity of q(θ)
is between 0 and −1 and (iii) the elasticity of θq(θ) is positive. This implies for
example that if θ increases, say by an increase in the number of job vacancies, then
it will be easier for workers to find a job (ph increases) and more difficult for firms
to fill their vacant jobs (pf decreases). Thus, as observed by Pissarides (1990),
such markets involve search (or congestion) externalities in which the probability
of finding a job (or filling a vacancy) depends on the relative numbers of ‘traders’
in the labor market, as reflected by θ. In other words there exists ‘stochastic
rationing’ which is independent of price adjustments.
Next we compare the matching function (2.37) with its finite-population coun-
terpart in (2.12) above. To do so, it is convenient to consider the normalized form,
φN , of ΦN as defined in (2.31) [together with (2.28)] above for all u = n/N and
v = m/N by
φN (u, v) = E
µ
FN
N
¯̄̄̄
n,m
¶
=
m
N
· pN
³ n
N
,
m
N
´
= v · pN (u, v) = v
·
1−
³
1− γs
Nv
´Nu¸
(2.45)
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If u and v are treated as continuous variables, then partial differentiation of (2.45)
again shows that φN (u, v) is increasing and concave in the relevant range of each
variable (i.e., for all values of u ≥ 1/N and v ≥ 1/N). However, it should be clear
from the form of (2.45) that φN fails to be linearly homogeneous. Indeed, it is
clear from the argument above that linear homogeneity is essentially a consequence
of limits. To see this, first observe that φN is of the form
φN (u, v) = v · P (Nu,Nv) (2.46)
where P (x, y) = 1−
³
1− γs
y
´x
. More generally, suppose that φN is of the form
(2.46) for any choice of P for which a limiting value
ξ (u, v) = limN→∞ P (Nu,Nv) (2.47)
exists, so that the desired asymptotic matching function can be written obtained
as
φ (u, v) = v · ξ (u, v) = v · limN→∞ P (Nu,Nv) (2.48)
Then for any λ > 0 it follows from (2.47) that
ξ (λu, λv) = limN→∞ P [N (λu) , N (λu)]
= limN→∞ P [(Nλ)u, (Nλ) v]
= lim(Nλ)→∞ P [(Nλ) u, (Nλ) v]
= ξ (u, v) (2.49)
Hence the limit probability function, ξ , must be homogeneous of degree zero, and
it follows at once from (2.48) that φ must be homogenous of degree one, i.e. that
φ (λu, λv) = λv · ξ (λu, λv) = λv · ξ (u, v) = λ · φ (u, v) (2.50)
Note finally that this limit property also shows that any finite-population matching
function of the form (2.46) must always be approximately linearly homogeneous
as N becomes large. In the present case, it is well known that the limit in (2.34)
is reached rather quickly. In fact, numerical examples show that for populations
as small N = 5 the function φN in (2.45) is approximately linearly homogeneous
for all λ > 1.
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2.5. System Steady States
Given these asymptotic approximations, the appropriate equations describing
steady states of the system can now be summarized as follows. Observe first
from the limiting relations
(u, v, f) = plimN→∞
·
E
µ
UN
N
¶
, E
µ
V N
N
¶
, E
µ
FN
N
¶¸
(2.51)
that by dividing both (2.17) and (2.18) by N and taking limits, we obtain the
steady-state relations
(1− ρ) f + ρ v = β (2.52)
(1− ρ) f = ρ (1− u) (2.53)
which together with (2.37) can be transformed into the pair of steady-state equa-
tions12
v + (1− u) = β/ρ (2.54)
ρ (1− u) = (1− ρ) v £1− e−(γsu/v)¤ (2.55)
If for any given search intensity, s ∈ [0, 1] , we now designate each solution,
[u(s), v(s)], to [(2.54),(2.55)] {or [(2.26), (2.55)]} as a steady state for s, then the
main result of this section is to establish the existence and uniqueness of steady
states. To do so, note first that when β < ρ [so that by (2.24) there is less than
one job per person in the steady state], it is possible to obtain negative values for
vacancy rates, v, in (2.54). But since steady states are only meaningful if v ≥ 0,
we now specify this nonnegativity condition in terms of unemployment rates, u,
as follows. Recall from (2.26) that v = u+ a ≥ 0 iff u ≥ −a. Hence letting
ua = max{0,−a} , (2.56)
it follows that the only meaningful steady states are those with u ∈ [ua, 1]. With
these observations, our main result is to show that (the proof is given in section
A.5 of the Appendix):
Theorem 2.2 (Fixed-Search Equilibrium). For each search intensity, s ∈ (0, 1],
there exists a unique steady state, [u(s), v(s)], with u(s) ∈ (ua, 1). In addi-
tion, both u(s) and v(s) are positive decreasing differentiable functions of s with
u(0) = 1 and v(0) = β/ρ .
12Notice that (2.54) is identical with the steady-state relation already obtained in (2.26).
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This steady state can be compared to that of the MP (Mortensen-Pissarides)
model, by noting that the Beveridge curve in MP is very similar to our steady-
state condition (2.55). In contrast to the free entry condition in MP (mentioned
in the Introduction), our steady-state condition (2.54) results from the underlying
birth-death process on vacancies. This steady-state can also be compared to that
of the BD (Blanchard-Diamond) model by observing that equations (2.54) and
(2.55) are essentially a variation of the steady-state conditions derivable from
their recursive equation system [(A.1) through (A.5)].13 The only real differences
(aside from stochasticity) are that (i) their discrete time period is a week rather
than a day, (ii) their job seekers are indexed by unemployment duration, and (iii)
their stock of possible jobs is finite rather than denumerable, as in our case.14
Turning next to the comparative statics of this steady state, observe that vari-
ations with respect to parameter s were established in Theorem 2.2. The following
additional comparative-static properties can also be established (see section A.6
of the Appendix):
∂u
∂γ
< 0
∂u
∂β
< 0
∂u
∂ρ
> 0 (2.57)
∂v
∂γ
< 0
∂v
∂β
> 0
∂v
∂ρ
< 0 (2.58)
These relations can be used to further clarify the basic role of each parameter
in the model. From the unemployed worker’s viewpoint (2.57) it is clear that
he/she is more likely to get a job by searching more frequently (s ↑) or being
qualified for a wider range of jobs (γ ↑). Similarly, hiring is more likely if new job
opportunities are created at a faster rate (β ↑) or existing job opportunities are
closed at a slower rate (ρ ↓). From the firm’s viewpoint (2.58) it is equally clear
that increased searching effort (s ↑) and broader worker qualifications (γ ↑) will
increase the likelihood of a job being filled, and hence decrease vacancies. Also,
vacancies are more likely to be filled if new vacancies are created at a slower rate
13In particular, if ρ is replaced by the transition probability π0 in BD, then our condition (2.55)
is a consequence of the steady-state conditions derivable from conditions [(A1),(A3),(A5)] in BD.
Similarly, if our steady-state expected jobs per worker, β/ρ, is replaced by their steady-state
expected jobs per worker, π1π0+π1
K
N , then our condition (2.54) is a consequence of the steady-state
conditions derivable from conditions [(A1),(A2),(A3),(A5)] in BD.
14Recall that our basic states are of the form (V Nt = m,U
N
t = n) with implicit domains
m ∈ Z+ and n ∈ {0, 1, .., N}. Note also that the finite-stock model in BD requires that each
job have three possible states: ‘filled’, ‘vacant’, and ‘idle’. However this distinction is of little
consequence in terms of the actual behavior of the two models.
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(β ↓) or if existing vacancies die at a faster rate (ρ ↑). Note in particular, that the
qualification probability, γ, can now be viewed as a matching index in the sense
that larger values increase both the likelihood of unemployed workers being hired
and vacant jobs being filled.
To illustrate these results, let ρ = .0027 [so that expected life of a job is
about one year] and let β = .0054 [so that by (2.24) there are about two jobs
(vacant or active) per worker in steady state]. In addition, suppose that workers
have a 50-50 chance of being qualified for any given job (γ = .5). If each day of
the year is a working day, and if unemployed workers search for jobs every day
(s = 1), then under these conditions the steady-state unemployment rate is 0.5%
(u = .005). [In addition, the steady-state vacancy rate is v = 1.005 (about one job
per worker).] Hence even in ‘good times’ with two jobs per worker, and with full
search effort by the unemployed, there is a small level of residual unemployment
due purely to frictional effects of job competition and qualification matching. But,
as stated in Theorem 2.2, if search intensity decreases, then unemployment must
increase. For example, if workers search only once a month (s = .033) then
residual unemployment rises to about 14% (u = .141).
This situation may be contrasted with ‘bad times’, as represented by a drop
in the job creation rate to β = .00135 (resulting in only one job for every two
workers). In this case, even with full search intensity (s = 1), the unemployment
rate in steady state exceeds 50% (u = .5013). [Note that a = −.5 implies ua = .5,
so that as in Theorem 2.2, u ∈ (ua, 1), and v = .0013 > 0.] It is also interesting
to observe that unemployment rates are now quite insensitive to search intensities
over a wide range of values. For example, a search intensity of only one day a year
(s = .0027) has almost no perceptible effect on unemployment rates (u = .5014).
The intuition here is that with so few jobs created, new jobs tend to be quickly
filled even if only a few potential workers show up at the market (as evidenced
by the low vacancy rate above). Hence unemployment in ‘bad times’ tends to be
more structural than frictional. This also shows that diligent search efforts can
sometimes be quite fruitless, and suggests that unemployed workers may wish to
alter their search intensities depending on the situation.
3. Endogenous Search Intensities
These observations lead naturally to the question of how unemployment levels
may be affected if unemployed workers are allowed to choose their own levels of
search intensity. Basically, this choice involves a trade-off between the leisure
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time lost and the expected income gained (from quicker job acquisition) by more
frequent job search. To model this trade-off explicitly, we begin by considering the
relative value of employment and unemployment in terms of the utility levels and
discounted utility streams associated with each state. Here the respective classes
of unemployed workers and employed workers are denoted by ‘0’ and ‘1’.
3.1. Effective-Income Utility
If individual daily income is denoted by y, and if the fraction of time spent each
day in leisure activities is denoted by l, then the individual’s utility for (l, y) is
postulated to be of the form
U (l, y) = lα y (3.1)
with parameter α ∈ (0, 1). This utility can be regarded as the individual’s effec-
tive daily income, discounted by the fraction of leisure time available for consump-
tion.15 As will become clear below, the assumption of decreasing returns to leisure
(i.e., 0 < α < 1) is critical for our purposes, in that it allows meaningful optimal
search intensities, s, other than the extremes 0 and 1. In particular, if the leisure
time for unemployed workers is taken to include all time spent not searching for
work, then the expected fraction of leisure time for an unemployed worker with
search intensity, s, is simply 1 − s. Hence if it is assumed that income for such
individuals is given by a daily unemployment benefit, b, then the relevant effective
daily income for each unemployed worker is given by
U0 (s) = (1− s)α b . (3.2)
Here search intensity, s, constitutes the only relevant decision variable for unem-
ployed workers.
Similarly, if it is assumed that the income of employed workers is given by the
daily wage, w, and that their fraction of leisure time, l1, is constant, then the
effective daily income for all employed workers is given by
U1 = l
α
1 w . (3.3)
15Note also that this utility can be viewed as the indirect utility obtained from a standard
log-linear function, U(l, z) = lαzβ, in leisure time, l, and composite good, z, subject to time
and budget constraints. In particular, if the price of z is taken to be the numeraire, and l is
treated as the fraction of time spent in leisure (so that total time is one), then the budget and
time constraints can be written respectively as z = y and l+ s = 1 so that 0 ≤ l ≤ 1. Hence the
corresponding indirect utility (with respect to the budget constraint) is obtained by replacing
z with y . The choice of β = 1 (together with the dimensionless nature of l ) yields an indirect
utility in (3.1) which is in monetary units, and hence is interpretable as ‘effective’ income.
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Since the wage level is here taken to be fixed, there are no relevant decision vari-
ables for employed workers. Hence the value U1 can be regarded as an exogenous
parameter in the present model.
3.2. Lifetime Effective-Income Streams
Recall that our basic objective is to model the decision problem for an unemployed
worker who is currently considering his/her choice of search intensity, s, (which for
simplicity can be regarded as the choice of a roulette wheel to use each morning
in deciding whether to search that day). To weigh alternative choices, the worker
must evaluate the expected future effective-income streams resulting from each
choice of s. [In the following development, we suppress dependence of all variables
on s except when needed, so that for example we write U0 for U0 (s).] At each
point of time in the future the worker will be in one of two states: unemployed
(0) or employed (1). If the relevant discount rate for all workers is the same,
and is denoted by σ ∈ (0, 1) [representing the value today of a dollar received
tomorrow], then the expected values, E (I0) and E (I1), of the discounted effective
income streams, I0 and I1, starting from each possible state can be determined
as follows. Observe that if the duration times (number of consecutive days) in
each state are denoted respectively by T0 and T1, then by employing the identity,Pt−1
k=0 σ
k = (1− σt) / (1− σ), it follows that the conditional expectation of I0
given a duration of t days in unemployment must be of the form:
E (I0|T0 = t) =
t−1X
k=0
σk U0 + σ
tE (I1)
=
µ
1− σt
1− σ
¶
U0 + σ
tE (I1) , t = 1, 2, ... (3.4)
For example, workers hired on the first day do not start work until the next day
(by assumption). This implies that on the first day, workers continue to receive
unemployment benefit, b, and realize utility level, U0. From the next day onward,
workers will enjoy the expected utility stream, E (I1), starting in the employed
state, so that E (I0|T0 = 1) = U0 + σ E (I1).
Similarly, when a worker is employed, the conditional expectation of I1 given
an employment duration of t days is easily seen to be of essentially the same form:
E (I1|T1 = t) =
µ
1− σt
1− σ
¶
U1 + σ
tE (I0) , t = 0, 1, 2, ... (3.5)
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Notice however that in this case, employment duration starts from zero rather
than one. This is a consequence of our assumption that a worker may be hired
and let go on the same day. In this particular case, the expected utility stream is
not different from that of an unemployed worker, so that E (I1|T1 = 0) = (0)U1+
σ0E (I0) = E (I0). On the other hand, employed workers who are not layed off
immediately will enjoy at least one day of effective employment income, U1.
If we now identify the lifetime values, V0 and V1, of these states with the
unconditional expectations, E (I0) and E (I1),16 then we may employ (3.4) and
(3.5) to solve for these values in terms of the effective incomes, U0 and U1, as
follows. First observe that by definition,
V0 = E (I0) = ET0 [E (I0|T0)]
= ET0
·µ
1− σT0
1− σ
¶
U0 + σ
T0 V1
¸
=
Ã
1−E ¡σT0¢
1− σ
!
U0 +E
¡
σT0
¢
V1
=
µ
1− e0
1− σ
¶
U0 + e0 V1 (3.6)
where e0 = E
¡
σT0
¢
, and similarly that,
V1 = E (I1) = ET1 [E (I1|T1)]
= ET1
·µ
1− σT1
1− σ
¶
U1 + σ
T1 V0
¸
=
µ
1− e1
1− σ
¶
U1 + e1 V0 (3.7)
where e1 = E
¡
σT1
¢
. These equations may in turn be solved simultaneously to
yield the following expressions for V0 and V1 in terms of U0 and U1:
V0 =
1− e0
1− e0 e1
µ
U0
1− σ
¶
+
e0 (1− e1)
1− e0 e1
µ
U1
1− σ
¶
(3.8)
V1 =
1− e1
1− e0 e1
µ
U1
1− σ
¶
+
e1 (1− e0)
1− e0 e1
µ
U0
1− σ
¶
(3.9)
16As with all models of this type, workers are assumed to ignore their own mortality, and to
behave as though their future were infinite.
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What remains to be determined are the expected discount factors e0 and e1.
To do so, we begin by establishing the exact distributions of T0 and T1. Turning
first to T0, let the hiring probability in (2.42) be denoted by ph, and observe
that the probability of leaving unemployment on day t = 1 is by definition the
joint probability, s ph, of going to the labor market on that day and being hired.
Moreover, since an unemployment duration of t days means precisely that this
joint event first occurs on day t, it follows from our independence assumptions
that T0 must be geometrically distributed according to
P (T0 = t) = (1− s ph)t−1 s ph , t = 1, 2, ... (3.10)
Next, to determine the distribution of T1, recall that the probability of job termina-
tion on any day is given by ρ. Hence it follows from our ‘birth-death’ assumptions
on jobs that T1 must also be geometrically distributed according to17
P (T1 = t) = (1− ρ)t ρ , t = 0, 1, 2, ... (3.11)
Given these two distributions, we may now compute the desired expectations as
follows. First, by employing the identity,
P∞
t=1 a
t = a/ (1− a) for all a ∈ [0, 1), it
follows from (3.10) that
e0 = E
¡
σT0
¢
=
∞X
t=1
σt (1− s ph)t−1 s ph
=
ph s
1− ph s
∞X
t=1
[σ (1− ph s)]t
=
ph s
1− ph s
µ
σ (1− ph s)
1− σ (1− ph s)
¶
=
σ ph s
1− σ + σ ph s (3.12)
Similarly, by employing the identity,
P∞
t=0 a
t = 1/ (1− a) for all a ∈ [0, 1), it
17In the discrete time version of standard birth-death processes, exponential lifetimes are
replaced by their discrete geometric counterparts.
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follows from (3.11) that
e1 = E
¡
σT1
¢
=
∞X
t=0
σt (1− ρ)t ρ
= ρ
∞X
t=0
[σ (1− ρ)]t = ρ
µ
1
1− σ (1− ρ)
¶
=
ρ
1− σ + σ ρ (3.13)
3.3. Calculation of the Optimal Search Intensity
Returning to our basic decision problem, suppose that an unemployed worker is
currently reconsidering his search intensity level, s. With an eye toward our ulti-
mate goal of determining an equilibrium search intensity for the system, suppose
also that the system is in a steady state where all workers are currently using the
same search intensity level, say s. Associated with this search intensity level (as in
section 1 above) is a steady-state hiring probability (2.42) which we again denote
by ph = ph (s), and a steady-state lifetime value of employment, which we denote
by V1 = V1 (s). Here it is assumed that perturbations in the search intensity, s, of
a single unemployed worker cannot influence these steady state values, and hence
that ph and V1 can be treated as constants in the worker’s decision problem. To
formulate this problem, observe next that the expected discount value, e0, in (3.12)
now takes the form
e0 (s) =
σ ph s
1− σ + σ ph s (3.14)
where the hiring probability, ph, is again beyond the individual’s control, but
where his choice of s affects his unemployment duration, and thus his value of e0.
Given these observations, we may now use (3.2), (3.6) and (3.12) to express his
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lifetime value, V0, solely in terms of s as follows:
V0 (s) =
µ
1− e0 (s)
1− σ
¶
U0 (s) + e0 (s) V1
=
µ
1− σ ph s
1− σ + σ ph s
¶
U0 (s)
1− σ +
µ
σ ph s
1− σ + σ ph s
¶
V1
=
µ
1− σ
1− σ + σ ph s
¶
(1− s)α b
1− σ +
µ
σ ph s
1− σ + σ ph s
¶
V1
=
(1− s)α b+ σ ph s V1
1− σ + σ ph s (3.15)
Thus the relevant decision problem is to choose a value of s ∈ [0, 1] which maxi-
mizes (3.15). To solve this problem, we begin by differentiating (3.15),
V 00 (s) =
σ ph V1 − α (1− s)α−1 b
1− σ + σ ph s −
σ ph s V1 + (1− s)α b
1− σ + σ ph s
µ
σ ph
1− σ + σ ph s
¶
=
1
1− σ + σ ph s
£
σ ph V1 − α (1− s)α−1 b− σ ph V0 (s)
¤
, (3.16)
and observing that the first-order condition, V 00 (s) = 0, holds iff the bracketed
term is zero, which can be rewritten as
α (1− s)α−1 b = σ ph [V1 − V0 (s)] . (3.17)
The interpretation of (3.17) is straightforward. The left hand side is the short-
run utility loss from a marginal increase in search intensity, and the right hand
side is the corresponding long-run utility gain from future employment. Thus, the
level of search intensity is optimal when the marginal gain of searching (reduced
unemployment duration) is equal to its marginal cost (reduced leisure time). By
totally differentiating (3.17), we obtain the following comparative-statics results
(where ph and V1 are here taken to be parameters):
∂s
∂b
< 0
∂s
∂ph
> 0
∂s
∂V1
> 0
∂s
∂σ
> 0 (3.18)
These lend support to the observations above. When there is an increase unem-
ployment benefits (b ↑), working becomes less attractive and unemployed workers
27
are less motivated to search. On the other hand, when there is an increase in
either the chance of being hired (ph ↑), the value of being employed (V1 ↑), or
the importance of the future (σ ↑), unemployed workers are more motivated to
search.
To establish the existence of solutions to (3.17) observe next from (3.16) that
lims→1V 00 (s) = −∞. Hence a sufficient condition for at least one solution to (3.17)
in (0, 1) is that V 00 (0) > 0. Moreover, by differentiating (3.16) once more, we see
that
V
00
0 (s) =
−α (1− α) (1− s)α−2 − 2σ ph V 00 (s)
1− σ + σ ph s (3.19)
and hence that
V 00 (s) = 0 ⇒ V
00
0 (s) =
−α (1− α) (1− s)α−2
1− σ + σ ph s < 0 (3.20)
Thus (3.15) can have at most one interior maximum, and we conclude that:
Proposition 3.1. For any given population search intensity, s, satisfying the con-
dition that V 00 (0) > 0, there exists a unique individual-optimum search intensity,
s (s). Moreover, this optimal search intensity is always in the open interval (0, 1),
and is given by the unique solution to (3.17).
3.4. Equilibrium with Endogenous Search Intensities
This solution to the optimal-search-intensity problem for unemployed workers
leads directly to an equilibrium condition for the system as a whole. In particular,
when search intensities are allowed to be endogenous, it is clear that a population
search intensity level, s, is a (Nash) equilibrium for the system iff s is the optimal
individual response to itself, i.e., iff s = s (s). Hence, if we now drop the ‘bar’
notation, and designate each common population choice of s as a population search
intensity, then it follows from (3.17) that a population search intensity, s, is an
equilibrium for the system iff s satisfies the following condition:
α (1− s)α−1 b = σ ph(s) [V1(s)− V0 (s)] (3.21)
where the hiring probability, ph(s), and the lifetime value of employment, V1(s),
are now written as functions of the population search intensity, s. Note however
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that this equilibrium condition assumes that s is positive, which in view of Propo-
sition 3.1 is equivalent to assuming that V 00(0) > 0. Moreover, the functions ph(s)
and V1(s) are not expressible in closed form, but rather are implicit functions of s
which depend on many other equilibrium quantities [including the steady-state un-
employment rate, u(s), and the equilibrium expected discount rate, e0(s)]. Hence
our next objective is to give an exact formulation of the desired equilibrium.
First we give an appropriate parametric specification of the positivity condi-
tion, V 00(0) > 0. In section A.7 of the Appendix, it is shown that this condition is
equivalent to:
U1 >
·
1 +
α (1− σ + σ ρ)
σ γ (1− ρ)
¸
b , (3.22)
which we now designate as the positivity condition. To interpret this condition,
recall that since the unemployment benefit, b, is precisely the effective income of
an unemployed worker, this positivity condition simply requires that the effective
wage income of employment [in (3.3)] be sufficiently greater than the unemploy-
ment benefit to encourage some degree of job search. Note that the simpler
condition that U1 be greater than b is by itself not sufficient, precisely because
the lifetime value of employment necessarily involves some time spent in unem-
ployment. Note also that this basic positivity condition involves all parameters
of the present model except for the job-creation rate, β. The key effect of this
parameter is on the hiring probability, which (as we have seen) reduces to γ as s
approaches zero. Hence the only condition on β needed to ensure positive equi-
librium search intensity is that β > 0, i.e., that some vacant jobs be available to
potential searchers.
Given this basic positivity condition, we now gather together all variables and
conditions which define the desired equilibrium. For any positive parameter vector
(α, β, ρ, γ, σ, b, U1) satisfying condition (3.22) with α, ρ, γ, σ ∈ (0, 1), a positive
vector E = (s, u, v, ph, e0, V0, V1) is designated as an endogenous-search equilibrium
iff E satisfies the following seven conditions with s ∈ (0, 1) [where a = (β/ρ) −
1 , e1 = ρ/ (1− σ + σ ρ) and U0(s) = (1− s)αb]:
v = u+ a (3.23)
ph =
v
s u
¡
1− e−γsuv ¢ (3.24)
ρ (1− u) = (1− ρ) u s ph (3.25)
e0 =
σ ph s
1− σ + σ ph s (3.26)
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V0 =
µ
1− e0
1− σ
¶
U0(s) + e0 V1 (3.27)
V1 =
µ
1− e1
1− σ
¶
U1 + e1 V0 (3.28)
σ ph (V1 − V0) = α (1− s)α−1 b (3.29)
The first three conditions follow directly from the steady-state equations (2.54)
and (2.55) together with the definition of the hiring probability in (2.42). Con-
ditions (3.26), (3.27), and (3.28) are precisely the definitions of e0, V0, and V1 in
(3.14), (3.6), and (3.7), respectively. Finally, (3.29) is a restatement of the basic
first-order condition in (3.21). Given this formal definition, our main result is to
show that (the proof is given in section A.8 of the Appendix):
Theorem 3.2 (Endogenous-Search Equilibrium). For each positive parame-
ter vector (α, β, ρ, γ, σ, b, U1) satisfying condition (3.22) with α, ρ, γ, σ ∈ (0, 1),
there exists a unique endogenous-search equilibrium.
The characterization of equilibrium search intensity, s, as the unique root
of an explicitly defined function [see (A.111) in the Appendix] also facilitates a
comparative-static analysis of s with respect to each parameter of the model.
With respect to the key wage parameter, w, (which will be endogenized below) it
is shown in section A.10 of the Appendix that higher wages always induce higher
levels of search intensity, i.e. that
Corollary 3.3 (Search Monotonicity). The unique equilibrium search inten-
sity, s(w), is a strictly increasing differentiable function of w.
These results can be illustrated by an extension of the example following The-
orem 2.2. Suppose that the leisure-time elasticity of effective income is α = .2
[so that a five percent gain in (the fraction of) leisure time yields a one percent
gain in effective income] and that the prevailing daily discount rate is σ = .999739
(yielding a compounded interest rate of ten percent per year). In addition, sup-
pose that employed workers spend one third of their time working (l1 = .66) and
that unemployed workers receive daily unemployment benefits of b = $60. Then
it follows from (3.22) [with U1 = la1w] that the minimum wage required to induce
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any search activity is given by w0 = $65.28. For the ‘good times’ scenario in the
example above ( β = .0054 and ρ = .0027) suppose that wages are just enough
to induce some search, say w = $65.30. Then the equilibrium search intensity
is naturally quite low (s = .045) and unemployment is about 12% (u = .119).
On the other hand, if wages are raised, say to w = $80, then (as in Corollary
3.3) the unemployed are now motivated to search on three out of every four days
(s = .757) and unemployment all but vanishes (u = .007). More interesting from
the individual’s viewpoint is the duration of unemployment, T0. To determine
the expected unemployment duration, Du = E(T0), observe from the properties
of the geometric distribution in (3.10) together with the steady state condition
(3.25) that
Du =
1
s ph
=
(1− ρ) u
ρ (1− u) (3.30)
In the present case, and increase in wages from w = $65.3 to w = $80 induces a
decrease in unemployment duration Du from 50 days to less than 3 days. Hence
it is clear that the key motivation for increased search intensity is to maximize
the fraction of days earning $80 rather than $60.
This is perhaps even more clear in the ‘bad times’ scenario (where β drops to
.00135). In this case, an increase in wages from w = $65.3 to w = $80 continues
to induce a sharp increase in search intensity from s = .007 to s = .49, even
though there is only a small effect on unemployment duration (decreasing from
374 days to 372 days). As in the original example, this unemployment situation is
primarily structural in nature and is not sensitive to frictional effects (decreasing
only from u = .503 to u = .501 with the increase in s). However, in the presence
of high wages, the prospect of cutting lengthy unemployment periods (of more
than a year) by only two days is sufficiently attractive to increase search intensity
by orders of magnitude. This responsiveness of search intensity to wage increases
forms a key link between the decision behavior of workers and firms – to which
we now turn.
4. Endogenous Wage Formation
In this final section, we relax the assumption that wages are fixed and allow
profit-maximizing firms to set wages. To do so, recall that each job generates its
own profit stream (while active). Hence we now assume that wages are chosen
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by the firm to maximize the present value of this profit stream.18 Here there is
a fundamental trade-off. If wages are set too low then (as in the Corollary 3.3
above) search intensities will also be low, so that jobs will remain vacant for long
periods with no profits earned. On the other hand, if wages are set too high, then
only small profits will be earned while the job is active. To model this trade-off,
we begin by considering the profits earned from a job initially posted on day t = 0.
Let the number of days until the job is filled be designated as the filling time, Tf ,
and similarly, let the number of days until the job is closed be designated as the
closing time, Tc. Clearly no profits are earned if Tc < Tf . Moreover, if Tc = Tf ,
then (by our conventions) the job is closed before any production occurs, and no
profits are earned. Hence if Tf = t, then the first day on which profits can be
earned is day t + 1. If the present value of the profit stream realized is denoted
by π, then by definition the expectation of π can be written as
E (π) =
∞X
t=0
∞X
d=1
E (π|Tf = t, Tc = t+ d)P (Tf = t, Tc = t+ d) (4.1)
If the daily revenue earned from each active job is assumed to be the same, and is
denoted by y, and if the above discount rate, σ, is also used by firms, then for each
choice of wage w, the conditional expectation E (π|Tf = t, Tc = t+ d) in (4.1) is
completely deterministic and is given by
E (π|Tf = t, Tc = t+ d) =
t+dX
k=t+1
σk (y − w) = (y − w) σ
t+1
¡
1− σd¢
(1− σ) (4.2)
Turning next to the joint probability P (Tf = t, Tc = t+ d), recall from our ‘birth-
death’ assumptions on jobs that closings are caused by external market forces, and
hence are independent of the job-filling process. Thus P (Tf = t, Tc = t+ d) =
P (Tf = t)P (Tc = t+ d), where the marginal distribution of Tc is given by (3.11),
and where the marginal distribution of Tf is also geometric with s ph in (3.10)
now replaced by the filling probability, pf , in (2.38), i.e.,
P (Tf = t) = (1− pf)t pf , t = 0, 1, 2, ... (4.3)
18This implicitly assumes that wages are part of the job offer, and are not negotiable. In the
present context, where jobs are completely specialized and are open to large numbers of potential
applicants, it is not unreasonable to assume that bargaining power of workers is minimal.
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Hence, substituting (4.2), (3.11) and (4.3) into (4.1), we see that
E(π) =
∞X
t=0
∞X
d=1
"
(y − w) σ
t+1
¡
1− σd¢
(1− σ)
#
(1− pf)t pf (1− ρ)t+d ρ
=
σ
(1− σ) (y − w) pf
Ã ∞X
t=0
[σ (1− ρ) (1− pf)]t
!Ã ∞X
d=1
¡
1− σd¢ ρ (1− ρ)d!
=
σ
(1− σ) (y − w)
µ
pf
1− σ (1− ρ) (1− pf)
¶µ
(1− ρ) (1− σ)
1− σ + σρ
¶
=
y − w
1− σ + σρ ·
σ (1− ρ) pf
(1− σ + σρ) + σ (1− ρ) pf (4.4)
What is crucial here from the firm’s viewpoint is the length of time during which
a given job produces profits. Once the job is announced, it takes time to be filled
(ph) and only stays open as long as there are profits to be earned (ρ). Moreover,
since the job-closure rate, ρ, is governed by general economic conditions, the
firm’s wage policy, w, can only influence pf (through the search intensity, s, as in
Corollary 3.3 above).
To express (4.4) in a more convenient form, we next recall from (2.54) and
(3.25) that
(1− ρ) u s ph = ρ (1− u) = β − ρv (4.5)
and from (2.38) and (2.42) that
u s ph = v pf (4.6)
By combining these and substituting for (1− ρ) pf in (4.4), we can write the
expectation in terms of the wage, w , and vacancy rate, v , as follows:
E(π) =
µ
y − w
1− σ + σρ
¶µ
σβ − σρv
σβ + (1− σ) v
¶
(4.7)
Hence expected discounted profits, E(π), are seen to be a product of two factors.
To interpret each factor, observe first that if the vacancy rate were zero then
E(π) reduces to the first factor. But since a zero vacancy rate implies that all
new jobs are filled instantaneously, the first factor represents the expected dis-
counted profit stream which could be earned if there were no employment-friction
effects, and hence may be designated as the friction-free profit factor. The second
factor (which is always between zero and one) represents the reduction in this
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maximum-profit stream due to the presence of employment-friction effects, and
thus is designated as the employment-friction factor.
To express this profit stream in terms of w alone, recall that the steady-state
value of v is determined by the search intensity level, s, which in turn is determined
by the prevailing wage level, w. Hence we may write v = v[s(w)], and express
(4.7) as a function of w, say
Π(w) =
µ
y − w
1− σ + σρ
¶µ
σβ − σρv[s(w)]
σβ + (1− σ) v[s(w)]
¶
(4.8)
In this form, the basic trade-off described above is now transparent. On the one
hand, the friction-free profit factor is clearly decreasing in w, reflecting the loss
in profits due to higher wage costs. On the other hand, since v(s) is decreasing
(Theorem 2.2), and s(w) is increasing (Corollary 3.3 ), it follows that v[s(w)] is
decreasing. Hence the employment-friction factor is increasing in w, reflecting the
gain in profits due to shorter expected filling times for vacant jobs.
It should also be emphasized that since wages affect search intensity, firms
cannot simply set wages at w = b and thereby extract all ‘rents’ earned by their
workers. As a consequence, employment is strictly preferable to unemployment,
and the state of being unemployed is necessarily involuntary (see the discussion
of Mortensen, 1989, pp.352-354).
Observe next that the construction of Π(w) is meaningful only if w is taken
to be a uniform wage for all jobs. Given that all active jobs yield the same daily
revenue, y, and that all workers have the same chance, γ, of being qualified for
any given job, it is not unreasonable to assume that firms regard uniform wage
levels as the only possible equilibrium states. If firms are also able to determine the
steady-state vacancy rates generated by such wages, i.e., to estimate the composite
function v[s(w)], then Π(w) can be taken as an appropriate objective function for
firms to maximize in choosing an optimal wage level, w∗. Finally, if it is assumed
to be common knowledge that all firms can make the same calculations, then under
these conditions the mutual adoption of w∗ may reasonably be said to constitute
an equilibrium for the system. In so far as this equilibrium involves maximizing
behavior by firms constrained by worker responses, it may be regarded as a type
of Stackelberg equilibrium for firms and workers.19
19Note in particular that the type of implicit wage-coordination behavior required in the
estimation of worker’s lifetime utility streams by firms closely parallels the ‘efficiency wage’
equilibrium of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
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To verify the existence of such an optimal wage, w∗, it is convenient to denote
the friction-free profits factor and employment-friction factor respectively by
P (w) =
y − w
1− σ + σρ , (4.9)
F (w) =
σ {β − ρv[s(w)]}
σβ + (1− σ) v[s(w)] , (4.10)
so that (4.8) can be written simply as
Π(w) = P (w) · F (w) . (4.11)
In these terms, note first that since the optimal search intensity for all suffi-
ciently small wage levels w must be given by s(w) = 0,20 it follows from Theorem
2.2 that v[s(w)] = β/ρ, and hence from (4.10) that F (w) = 0 [so that Π(w) = 0]
for all sufficiently small w. On the other hand, it is clear from (4.9) that P (w) ≤ 0
[and hence that Π(w) ≤ 0] for all w ≥ y. Thus the continuity of Π(w) is enough
to ensure the existence of an optimum wage level, w∗, in the open interval (0, y).
Finally, observe that the above notion of equilibrium implicitly assumes that w∗
is unique.21 While definitive conditions for uniqueness are unfortunately difficult
to establish (given the analytical complexity of the composite function, v[s(w)] ),
numerical examples show that w∗ is indeed unique over a wide range of parame-
ter values. Some analytical insight can be gained by observing that the second
derivative of (4.11) is of the form
Π00(w) = 2P 0(w)F 0(w) + P (w)F 00(w) (4.12)
Since we have already seen that P 0(w) < 0 and F 0(w) > 0, the positivity of P (w)
on (0, y) implies that Π00(w) < 0 whenever F 00(w) < 0. Moreover, by letting
v(w) = v[s(w)], it is straightforward to show that
F 00(w) = −σβ + (1− σ)F (w)
σβ + (1− σ)v(w)
½
v00(w) +
(1− σ) v0(w)2
σβ + (1− σ)v(w)
¾
, (4.13)
20This may be verified by observing from (3.3) and (3.13), together with (A.95) and (A.98),
that V 00(0) in (A.94) of the Appendix must become negative as w approaches zero. Hence
s(w) = 0 for all w at which V 00(0) < 0.
21However, such equilibria are in principle possible even with multiple optima. For example, if
the lowest optimal wage level is mutually recognized by firms as a ‘prominent point’ (Schelling,
1960), then they may be able to reach a tacit agreement with respect to this wage offer.
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which together with the positivity of the second term in the braces on the right
hand side (4.13) implies that F 00(w) < 0 whenever v00(w) > 0. Thus the profit
function Π(w) must always be strictly concave in the region where v(w) is strictly
convex. But for w in the range of the positivity condition (3.22) [with U1 = lα1 w],
the function v(w) must always decrease from β/ρ toward the positive asymptote
corresponding to full search intensity, s = 1. In particular, this implies that v(w)
must (at least) be strictly convex for ‘sufficiently large’ wage levels, w. Moreover
(as borne out by a range of numerical examples), v(w) is generally strictly convex
over the full range of w satisfying the positivity condition (3.22), so that Π(w) is
strictly concave on (0, y).
These qualitative results, can be illustrated by a further extension of the ex-
amples following Theorems 2.2 and 3.2 above. To do so, suppose that active jobs
earn a daily revenue of y = $100. Under the ‘good times’ scenario above, the wage
level which maximizes expected discounted profits is then given by w = $65.65.
Note that this is only slightly above the minimum wage, w0 = $65.28, required
to induce positive search. However, the induced search intensity, s = .225, is
substantial (about one day in four spent searching) and the corresponding unem-
ployment level is quite low (u = .024). The intuition here is that effective-income
utility in (3.2) is relatively insensitive to search intensities near s = 0, so that
leisure time only becomes critical for individuals when it is in very short supply.
Hence individuals are willing to give up a considerable amount of leisure time in
order to gain the first few dollars of added income above permanent unemploy-
ment. This low-wage property turns out to be quite robust to any changes in the
model parameters. In particular, if daily revenues are doubled to y = $200, then
the optimal wage level increases only to w = $66.19.22
In the ‘bad times’ scenario, the situation is naturally worse for everyone, espe-
cially workers. With a daily revenue of y = $100, firms are now motivated to offer
a wage of w = $65.34, only a few pennies above the minimal wage w0. While this
meager wage induces a seemingly low search intensity (s = .0094), this is enough
in the present tight job market to drive vacancy rates almost to zero (v = .002).
Hence from the firm’s viewpoint, there is no need to offer more.
22The ability of firms to extract most of the revenue surplus is of course a consequence of our
present job market structure, in which individual workers are assumed to be wage-takers who
do not engage in strategic bargaining.
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5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have presented an explicit micro model of job matching in which
heterogeneous workers allocate themselves to jobs with different skill requirements.
Within this framework it was shown that when the population size is large, the
asymptotic form of aggregate matching function is of an exponential type, and is
an instance of the general class of ‘production-like’ matching functions described
by Pissarides (1990). This function is of course only one among many possibilities,
including the Cobb-Douglas matching function used most frequently in empirical
research. Hence its major advantage is that it is derivable directly from an explicit
micro scenario which captures many important aspects of job matching behavior.
However, it is equally clear that this scenario is in many ways too simplistic, and
for example assumes both identical wages and revenues for all jobs and identical
information levels and matching (qualification) probabilities for all job seekers.
Hence this model is perhaps best regarded as a benchmark for constructing more
realistic behavioral scenarios.
In the second part of the paper, it was shown how this model can be used
to analyze the decision behavior of unemployed workers in choosing their opti-
mal search intensities, i.e., how many days per week to search. This focus was
motivated by our desire to extend the present framework to urban spatial labor
markets, where there a close connection between the choice of search intensity
and the spatial location of job seekers. In particular, it is shown in a companion
paper (Smith and Zenou, 1999) that the travel costs involved in job search can
play an important role in determining the location patterns of both employed and
unemployed workers with respect to jobs.
In the final section of the paper, it was shown how this model can be applied
to study the decision behavior of firms in choosing wage offers to maximize their
expected profit streams. Here again search intensities provided the key behavioral
link. In particular, unemployed workers were assumed to be wage-takers who
choose their levels of search intensity based on the prevailing wage level. This is
in sharp contrast to the wage-bargaining models which are most frequently used
in the literature. However, it is clear that elements of both are present in most job
markets, and should be reflected in more comprehensive models of job-matching
behavior.
37
References
[1] Blanchard, O.J. and P. Diamond (1989), ‘The Beveridge curve’, Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1-60.
[2] Blanchard, O.J. and P. Diamond (1993), ‘Ranking, random hiring, unem-
ployment duration, and wages’, unpublished manuscript, MIT.
[3] Blanchard, O.J. and P. Diamond (1994), ‘Ranking, unemployment duration,
and wages’, Review of Economic Studies, 61:417-434.
[4] Brumelle, S.L. and Y. Gerchak (1980), ‘A stochastic model allowing inter-
action among individuals and its behavior for large populations’, Journal of
Mathematical Sociology, 7:73-90.
[5] Burda, M. and C. Wyploz (1994), ‘Gross worker and job flows in Europe’,
European Economic Review, 38:1287-1315.
[6] Butters,G. (1977), ‘Equilibrium distributions of sales and advertising prices’,
Review of Economic Studies, 44:465-491.
[7] Hall, R.E. (1979), ‘An aspect of the economic role of unemployment’, in
G.Harcourt (ed.), Microeconomic Foundations of Macroeconomics.
[8] Davis, S.J., Haltiwanger, J. and S. Schuh (1996), Job Creation and Destruc-
tion, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA).
[9] Hamilton, J., Thisse, J-F. and Y. Zenou (1999), ‘Wage competition with
heterogeneous workers and firms’, Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming.
[10] Kulkarni, V.G. (1995), Modeling and Analysis of Stochastic Processes, Chap-
man & Hall, London.
[11] Mortensen, D.T. and C.A. Pissarides (1999), ‘New developments in models of
search in the labor market’, in Card, D. and O. Ashenfelter (eds.), Handbook
of Labor Economics, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, forthcoming.
[12] Mortensen, D.T. (1989), ‘The persistence and indeterminacy of unemploy-
ment in search equilibrium’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 91:347-370.
[13] Pissarides, C.A. (1990), Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford.
38
[14] Rao, C.R. (1973), Linear Statistical Inference and its Applications, Second
edition, Wiley, New York.
[15] Renyi, A. (1970), Foundations of Probability, Holden-Day, San Francisco.
[16] Sattinger, M. (1990), ‘Unemployment, the market for interviews, and wage
determination’, Journal of Political Economy, 98:356-371.
[17] Sattinger, M. (1993), ‘Assignment models of the distribution of earnings’,
Journal of Economic Literature, 31:831-880.
[18] Schelling, T.C. (1960), The Strategy of Conflict, Oxford University Press,
London.
[19] Shapiro, C. and J. Stiglitz (1984), ‘Equilibrium unemployment as a worker
discipline device’, American Economic Review, 74:433-444.
[20] Smith, T.E. and Y. Zenou (1999) ‘A spatial labor market model with job-
matching behavior’, CEPR Discussion Paper, London.
[21] Stout, W.F. (1974), Almost Sure Convergence, Academic Press, New York.
[22] Wilks, S. (1962), Mathematical Statistics, Wiley, New York..
A. Appendix
In this appendix, some of the more technical results in the text are established.
Each result is listed as a separate subsection:
A.1. Derivation of Expression (2.7)
To establish this result, observe first that by definition,
P (k|m,n) =
k−1X
l=0
(0) +
nX
l=k
Pm(k|l)P (l|n)
=
nX
l=k
"
l!
k! (l − k)!
µ
1
m
¶kµ
1− 1
m
¶l−k#
·
·
n!
l! (n− l)!s
l(1− s)n−l
¸
=
n!
l! (n− l)!
nX
l=k
(n− k)!
(l − k)! (n− l)!
µ
1− 1
m
¶l−k
sl(1− s)n−l . (A.1)
39
Hence, if we now let h = l− k (so that l = h+ k) then it may be concluded that:
P (k|m,n) =
µ
n
k
¶µ
1
m
¶k n−kX
h=0
(n− k)!
h! (n− k − h)!
µ
1− 1
m
¶h
sh+k (1− s)n−(h+k)
=
µ
n
k
¶µ
s
m
¶k n−kX
h=0
µ
n− k
h
¶³
s− s
m
´h
(1− s)(n−k)−h
=
µ
n
k
¶µ
s
m
¶k h³
s− s
m
´
+ (1− s)
in−k
=
µ
n
k
¶µ
s
m
¶k ³
1− s
m
´n−k
. (A.2)
A.2. Derivation of Expression (2.24)
To establish this limiting result for total jobs per capita, it is convenient to begin
by considering the underlying adjustment process more explicitly. If the total
number of jobs in the system on day t is denoted by JNt , so that by definition,
JNt = V
N
t +
¡
N − UNt
¢
, then it follows by adding (2.1) and (2.2) and collecting
terms that
JNt+1 = J
N
t +B
N
t −
¡
CNat + C
N
vt
¢
(A.3)
But if for each job, j = 1, . . . , JNt , we let the indicator variable, δj, be zero if job
j is closed on day t and one otherwise, then it follows by definition that
JNtX
j=1
δj = J
N
t −
¡
CNat + C
N
vt
¢
(A.4)
and hence that
JNt+1 = B
N
t +
JNtX
j=1
δj (A.5)
By our basic model assumptions, individual job closing are mutually independent,
and also independent of new job creations. Hence
E
¡
JNt+1|JNt
¢
= βN + (1− ρ)JNt
implies that the unconditional mean of JNt+1is given by
E
¡
JNt+1
¢
= EJNt
£
E
¡
JNt+1|JNt
¢¤
= βN + (1− ρ)E ¡JNt ¢ (A.6)
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and similarly,
var
¡
JNt+1|JNt
¢
= Nσ2 + (1− ρ) ρ JNt
implies that the unconditional variance of JNt+1is given by
var
¡
JNt+1
¢
= EJNt
£
var
¡
JNt+1|JNt
¢¤
= Nσ2 + (1− ρ) ρE ¡JNt ¢ (A.7)
Hence, letting JN denote the steady-state level of employment [so that E
¡
JNt
¢
=
E
¡
JN
¢
for all t], it follows from (A.6) that
E
¡
JN
¢
= βN + (1− ρ)E ¡JN¢
⇒ E ¡JN¢ = Nβ
ρ
⇒ E
µ
JN
N
¶
=
β
ρ
(A.8)
which together with (A.7) implies that
var
µ
JN
N
¶
=
1
N2
£
Nσ2 + (1− ρ) ρE ¡JN¢¤
=
1
N
£
σ2 + (1− ρ)β¤ (A.9)
Finally, since these equations imply both that limN→∞E
¡
JN/N
¢
= β/ρ and
limN→∞ var
¡
JN/N
¢
= 0, it then follows from an application of Chebyshev’s
Inequality that (2.24) must hold.
A.3. Derivation of Expression (2.35)
To establish (2.35) we first observe that the variance of the conditional random
variable in (2.30) has the binomial form:
var
¡
FN |m,n¢ = m · pN (1− pN) (A.10)
where pN = pN
¡
m
N
, n
N
¢
, so that in a manner similar to (2.31),
var
µ
FN
N
¯̄̄̄
m,n
¶
=
1
N2
[m · pN (1− pN)] (A.11)
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Hence, as a parallel to (2.32), we see that the variance of FN/N is given by
var
µ
FN
N
¶
=
µ
1
N
¶
EUN ,V N
·
pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
¸
(A.12)
But 0 ≤ pN ≤ 1 together with the nonnegativity of V N and expression (A.8) then
implies that
var
µ
FN
N
¶
≤
µ
1
N
¶
E
µ
V N
N
¶
=
µ
1
N
¶
β
ρ
(A.13)
Thus we see that
limN→∞ var
µ
FN
N
¶
= 0 (A.14)
and may conclude from Chebyshev’s inequality that
plimN→∞
FN
N
= limN→∞E
µ
FN
N
¶
(A.15)
whenever the limit on the right hand side exists. Hence by (2.32) and (2.33) it
suffices to show that
limN→∞EV N ,UN
·
pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
¸
= p(u, v) · v (A.16)
We begin by showing that the variance of this random variables diminishes to
zero. First observe that since var (X · Y ) ≤ 2 · var (X) var (Y ) and 0 ≤ pN ≤
1⇒ var (pN) ≤ 1, it follows that
var
·
pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
¸
≤ 2 · var
µ
V N
N
¶
(A.17)
Moreover, the identity, V N = JN +UN −N , (together with the Cauchy-Schwartz
Inequality) implies that
var
µ
V N
N
¶
= var
µ
JN
N
+
UN
N
¶
≤ var
µ
JN
N
¶
+ 2
¯̄̄̄
cov
µ
JN
N
· U
N
N
¶¯̄̄̄
+ var
µ
UN
N
¶
(A.18)
≤ var
µ
JN
N
¶
+ 2
·
var
µ
JN
N
¶
var
µ
UN
N
¶¸1/2
+ var
µ
UN
N
¶
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Hence, observing that var
¡
UN/N
¢
= u (1− u) /N ⇒limN→∞ var
¡
UN/N
¢
= 0
and that expression (A.9) implies limN→∞ var
¡
JN/N
¢
= 0, we may conclude
from (A.17) and (A.18) that
limN→∞ var
·
pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
¸
= 0 (A.19)
Thus, if it can be shown that
plimN→∞ pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
= p(u, v) · v (A.20)
then it will follow from well-known properties of moment convergence [see for
example Rao (1973, Theorem 2c.viii, p.121)] that (A.16) must hold.
To establish (A.20) it must be shown that for every > 0,
limN→∞ Pr
·¯̄̄̄
pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
− p(u, v) · v
¯̄̄̄
>
¸
= 0 (A.21)
But since
Pr
·¯̄̄̄
pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
− p(u, v) · v
¯̄̄̄
>
¸
≤ Pr
·¯̄̄̄
pN
µ
V N
N
,
UN
N
¶
V N
N
− p
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
¯̄̄̄
+¯̄̄̄
p
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
− p(u, v) · v
¯̄̄̄
>
¸
≤ Pr
·½¯̄̄̄
pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
− p
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
¯̄̄̄
>
2
¾
∪ (A.22)½¯̄̄̄
p
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
− p(u, v) · v
¯̄̄̄
>
2
¾¸
≤ Pr
½¯̄̄̄
pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
− p
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
¯̄̄̄
>
2
¾
+
Pr
½¯̄̄̄
p
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
− p(u, v) · v
¯̄̄̄
>
2
¾
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and since the continuity of the function, p (x, y) y, implies that for all > 0 [see
for example Wilks (1962, Theorem 4.3.6, p.163)],
limN→∞ Pr
½¯̄̄̄
p
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
− p(u, v) · v
¯̄̄̄
>
¾
= 0 , (A.23)
it suffices to show that for all > 0,
limN→∞Pr
½¯̄̄̄
pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
− p
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
V N
N
¯̄̄̄
>
¾
= 0 . (A.24)
Moreover, since the product function is continuous, and since the sequence, V N/N
converges in probability to a constant (2.25), it is enough to show that for all > 0
[see for example Wilks (1962, Theorem 4.3.6)] :
limN→∞ Pr
½¯̄̄̄
pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
− p
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶¯̄̄̄
>
¾
= 0 . (A.25)
We do so by establishing bound on the rate of convergence of the sequence of
functions in (2.34). First we show that the function wN (x) defined for all N and
x by
wN (x) = e
−x −
³
1− x
N
´N
(A.26)
satisfies the following inequality:
0 ≤ x ≤ N ⇒ 0 ≤ wN (x) ≤ e
−1
N
(A.27)
To see this, observe first that if wN (x) < 0 for some x ∈ [0, N ], then since
wN (0) = 0 and wN (N) > 0, it follows that wN must achieve a negative minimum
value in the open interval (0, N). But since
0 = w0N (x) = −e−x +
³
1− x
N
´N−1
⇒
³
1− x
N
´N
=
³
1− x
N
´
e−x
⇒ wN (x) = x
N
e−x > 0 (A.28)
the minimum cannot be negative. Hence the first inequality on the right hand
side of (A.27) must hold. Moreover, since the expression, x
N
e−x, is easily seen to
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achieve its maximum value at x = 1, it also follows that wN (x) ≤ e−1/N , and
hence that (A.27) must hold. Next we show that for any x, y, z with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
and y ≥ z ≥ 0,
z ≥ y
2
⇒ yx − zx ≤ (y − z) x
³y
2
´x−1
(A.29)
To do so, observe that the (differentiable) function, f (y) = yx, is concave for
0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and hence that
yx − zx = f (y)− f (z)
≤ (y − z) f 0 (z)
= (y − z) ¡x · zx−1¢ (A.30)
But since 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and z ≥ (y/2) imply that zx−1 ≤ (y/2)x−1, it then follows
that (A.29) must hold. Finally, by letting
φ (x, y) = e−1x
µ
e−y
2
¶x−1
(A.31)
and
r (y) = γs/y (A.32)
we may now employ these results to show that for all x ∈ [0, 1], y > 0 and
N ≥ 2er(y), the difference between the functions in (2.28) and in (2.33) can be
bounded by:
0 ≤ p (x, y)− pN (x, y) ≤ φ (x, r (y))
N
(A.33)
To do so, observe first from (A.26) an (A.27) that 0 < r (y) < 2er(y) ≤ N implies
that
0 ≤ e−r(y) −
µ
1− r (y)
N
¶N
≤ e
−1
N
(A.34)
But since N ≥ 2er(y) > ¡2er(y)¢ e−1 ⇒ e−1/N ≤ e−r(y)/2, it then follows from
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(A.29) and (A.34) that
0 ≤ e−r(y) −
µ
1− r (y)
N
¶N
≤ e
−r(y)
2
⇒
µ
1− r (y)
N
¶N
≥ e
−r(y)
2
(A.35)
⇒ 0 ≤ £e−r(y)¤x − "µ1− r (y)
N
¶N#x
≤
"
e−r(y) −
µ
1− r (y)
N
¶N#
· x
µ
e−r(y)
2
¶x−1
⇒ 0 ≤ £e−r(y)¤x − "µ1− r (y)
N
¶N#x
≤
µ
e−1
N
¶
x
µ
e−r(y)
2
¶x−1
⇒ 0 ≤ e−γsx/y −
µ
1− γs
Ny
¶Nx
≤ φ (x, r (y))
N
⇒ 0 ≤ p (x, y)− pN (x, y) ≤ φ (x, r (y))
N
. (A.36)
To use this result, observe that if we restrict attention to values of > 0 small
enough to ensure that v − > 0, and let
B (v, u) = {(x, y) : |v − x| ≤ , |u− y| ≤ } , (A.37)
then function, φ (x, r (y)), is seen to be continuous on the compact set, B (u, v) ,
so that the maximum value,
φ = max {φ (x, r (y)) : (x, y) ∈ B (u, v)} (A.38)
is well defined and finite. Hence, if for each δ > 0 we choose No = No ( , δ) large
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enough to ensure that the following three conditions hold for all N ≥ No :
N ≥ max
½
φ + 1
, 2er(v− )
¾
(A.39)
Pr
µ¯̄̄̄
V N
N
− v
¯̄̄̄
>
¶
<
δ
2
(A.40)
Pr
µ¯̄̄̄
UN
N
− u
¯̄̄̄
>
¶
<
δ
2
(A.41)
[where conditions (A.40) and (A.41) are possible in view of (2.25) and (2.22),
respectively], then for all such N we can obtain a probability bound for (A.25) as
follows. First, for any realized values, uN (∈ [0, 1]) and vN (> 0), of UN/N and
V N/N , respectively, observe that
|pN (uN , vN)− p (uN , vN)| >
⇒ |pN (uN , vN)− p (uN , vN)| > min
½
,
φ (uN , r (vN))
N
¾
(A.42)
But if this minimum is not , then inequality, |pN (uN , vN)− p (uN , vN)| > φ (uN , r (vN)) /N
implies from (A.33) that N < 2er(vN ), which together with (A.39) implies that
2er(v− ) < 2er(vN ). Hence by (A.32) we must have vN < v− . On the other hand,
if is the minimum, then by (A.39), φ (uN , r (vN)) ≥ N > φ . But since this in
turn implies from (A.38) that either |uN − u| > or |vN − v| > must hold, we
see that in all cases,
|pN (uN , vN)− p (uN , vN)| > min
½
,
φ (uN , r (vN))
N
¾
⇒ {|uN − u| > } or {|vN − v| > } (A.43)
Hence, by combining (A.42) and (A.43), we may conclude that for all N satisfying
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(A.39) through (A.41):
Pr
½¯̄̄̄
pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
− p
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶¯̄̄̄
>
¾
≤ Pr
µ¯̄̄̄
pN
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶
− p
µ
UN
N
,
V N
N
¶¯̄̄̄
> min
½
,
φ (UN , r (VN))
N
¾¶
≤ Pr
µ½¯̄̄̄
UN
N
− u
¯̄̄̄
>
¾
∪
½¯̄̄̄
V N
N
− v
¯̄̄̄
>
¾¶
≤ Pr
µ¯̄̄̄
UN
N
− u
¯̄̄̄
>
¶
+Pr
µ¯̄̄̄
V N
N
− v
¯̄̄̄
>
¶
< δ (A.44)
Finally, since the choice of δ was arbitrary, it may be concluded that (A.25) holds
for every (sufficiently small) choice of > 0.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 2.1
First observe that for all λ > 0,
φ(λu, λv) = λv
£
1− e−(γsλu/λv)¤ = λv £1− e−(γsu/v)¤ = λ · φ(u, v)
and hence that φ is linearly homogeneous. Next observe that φ is twice continu-
ously differentiable with:
∂
∂u
φ (u, v) = γ s e−(γsu/v) (A.45)
∂2
∂u2
φ (u, v) = −(γ s)
2
v
e−(γsu/v) (A.46)
∂
∂v
φ (u, v) = 1−
³
1 +
γ s u
v
´
e−(γsu/v) (A.47)
∂2
∂v2
φ (u, v) = −(γ s u)
2
v3
e−(γsu/v) (A.48)
so that monotonicity follows from the positivity of (A.45) and (A.47).23 Finally,
to establish concavity, observe in addition that
∂2
∂v ∂u
φ (u, v) =
³γ s
v
´2
u e−(γsu/v) (A.49)
23To see that (A.47) is positive, let z (x) = 1 − (1 + x) e−x , and observe that z(0) = 0 and
z0 (x) = x e−x > 0 for all x > 0.
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and hence from [(A.46),(A.48),(A.49)], that the Hessian of φ is given by
H = (γ s)2 e−(γsu/v)
µ −1
v
u
v2
u
v2
−u2
v3
¶
(A.50)
Thus for any column vector, z = (x, y)0 , it follows that
z0H z = (γ s)2 e−(γsu/v)
·
(x, y)
µ −1
v
u
v2
u
v2
−u2
v3
¶µ
x
y
¶¸
= (γ s)2 e−(γsu/v)
µ
−1
v
¶·
x2 − 2
³u
v
´
x y +
³u
v
´2
y2
¸
= − (γ s)2 e−(γsu/v)
µ
1
v
¶³
x− u
v
y
´2
≤ 0 (A.51)
and we see that H is negative semidefinite. Moreover, (A.51) is strictly negative
except for vectors z colinear with (u, v) , i.e., with z = (λu, λv) for some λ. Hence
φ is seen to be strictly concave except for the linearity-on-rays property implied
by linear homogeneity.
A.5. Proof of Theorem 2.2
By substituting (2.26) into (2.55) and letting
G (u, s) = ρ (1− u)− (1− ρ) (u+ a)
³
1− e−γs uu+a
´
, (A.52)
we see that for each given s ∈ (0, 1] the steady-state values of u are precisely the
roots of the equation
G (u, s) = 0 (A.53)
To establish existence of solutions, observe first that for u = 1 we have
G (1, s) = − (1− ρ) (1 + a)
³
1− e−γs 11+a
´
(A.54)
But since β/ρ > 0 implies from (2.27) that 1 + a > 0, we see that
G (1, s) < 0 (A.55)
Next we show that
G (ua, s) > 0 (A.56)
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for ua in (2.56). To do so observe first that if a > 0 then ua = 0 and
G (ua, s) = ρ > 0 . (A.57)
Next, if a = 0 then G (u, s) = ρ (1− u) − (1− ρ) u (1− e−γs) and u0 = 0 , so
again
G (ua, s) = ρ > 0 . (A.58)
Finally, if a < 0 then β > 0 implies that ua = −a = | a | < 1 , so limu↓ua u/ (u+ a) =
∞ implies that limu↓ua
³
1− e−γs uu+a
´
= 1, and hence that
lim
u↓uaG (u, s) = ρ (1− | a |) > 0 (A.59)
Thus (A.56) holds in all cases, and we may conclude from the continuity of G
that for each s ∈ (0, 1] there exists a steady-state value, u(s) , in the open interval
(ua, 1) . In particular, this implies that u(s) > 0. Next, to establish uniqueness
of this steady state, it suffices to show the partial derivative of G with respect to
u is everywhere negative in the interval (ua, 1), i.e. that
∂
∂u
G (u, s) < 0 , u ∈ (ua, 1) (A.60)
For this will imply that G (·, s) can pass through zero no more than once in the
interval (ua, 1) . By using the identity
d
du
µ
u
u+ a
¶
=
a
(u+ a)2
(A.61)
it may be verified that
∂
∂u
G (u, s) = (1− ρ) e−γs uu+a
µ
u+ a− γsa
u+ a
¶
− 1 (A.62)
which together with u + a > 0 for all u > ua implies that (A.62) is well defined
on (ua,∞) , and in particular satisfies
limu→∞
∂
∂u
G (u, s) = (1− ρ) e−γs (1)− 1 < 0 (A.63)
Hence it suffices to show that the second partial derivative is positive for all u > ua
[which will imply that (A.62) must be everywhere negative on (ua,∞) ]. By direct
calculation it follows from (A.62) and (A.61) that
∂2
∂u2
G (u, s) =
(1− ρ)
(u+ a)3
(γ s a)2 e−γs
u
u+a > 0 (A.64)
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for all u > ua . Thus (A.60) holds, and u(s) must be the unique solution of (A.52)
in the interval [ua, 1] . These unique solutions define a function of s which can be
analyzed by implicit differentiation of G [u(s), s] as follows. Since G [u(s), s] ≡ 0,
we see that
0 ≡ ∂
∂s
G [u(s), s] ≡ ∂G
∂u
u0(s) +
∂G
∂s
⇒ u0(s) ≡ −∂G/∂s
∂G/∂u
(A.65)
for all s ∈ [0, 1] . But since
∂
∂s
G (u, s) = − (1− ρ) γ u e−γs uu+a < 0 , (A.66)
we may then conclude from (A.60) and (A.65) that u0(s) < 0 , and hence that
u(s) is strictly decreasing in s . Finally since (2.26) implies that
v(s) = u(s) + a (A.67)
for all s , and since u(s) ∈ (ua, 1) implies that 0 < u(s) + a = v(s) , we see that
v(s) is also a decreasing positive differentiable function of s .
A.6. Verification of (2.57) and (2.58)
First observe that since γ appears only as a product with s in (2.55) it follows
at once that changes with respect to γ and s are always in the same direction,
and hence (by the proof of Theorem 2.2) that both ∂u/∂γ < 0 and ∂v/∂γ < 0.
Thus we need only consider changes with respect to β and ρ. To establish the
properties in (2.57) we begin by solving for v in (2.54) and substituting into (2.55)
to obtain the relation:
H(u, ρ, β) = ρ(1− u)− (1− ρ)
µ
u+
β
ρ
− 1
¶£
1− e−X(u,ρ,β)¤ (A.68)
where
X(u, ρ, β) =
γsu
u+ β
ρ
− 1 (A.69)
with γ and s held fixed. Next recalling from (2.54) together with Theorem 2.2 that
u+ β
ρ
−1 = v > 0, we see that X is always positive and continuously differentiable
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in each of its arguments. In particular we have
∂X
∂u
=
γs
u+ β
ρ
− 1
Ã
1− u
u+ β
ρ
− 1
!
(A.70)
∂X
∂ρ
= −
µ
β
ρ2
¶
X
u+ β
ρ
− 1 (A.71)
∂X
∂β
= −
µ
1
ρ
¶
X
u+ β
ρ
− 1 (A.72)
Hence from (A.70) it follows that
∂H
∂u
= −ρ− (1− ρ)
½¡
1− e−X¢+µu+ β
ρ
− 1
¶µ
e−X · ∂X
∂u
¶¾
= −ρ− (1− ρ)
(¡
1− e−X¢+ γse−X Ã1− u
u+ β
ρ
− 1
!)
= −ρ− (1− ρ)©1 + γse−X − (1 +X)e−Xª (A.73)
But since 1 +X < eX for all X > 0, and since
1 +X < eX ⇒ (1 +X)e−X < 1 (A.74)
it follows that the part of expression (A.73) in braces is positive, and hence that
∂H
∂u
< 0 (A.75)
Next observe from (A.72) that
∂H
∂β
= −(1− ρ)
½
1
ρ
¡
1− e−X¢+µu+ β
ρ
− 1
¶µ
e−X · ∂X
∂β
¶¾
= −
µ
1− ρ
ρ
¶©
1− e−X −Xe−Xª
= −
µ
1− ρ
ρ
¶©
1− (1 +X)e−Xª (A.76)
and we may again conclude from (A.74) that
∂H
∂β
< 0 (A.77)
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But since H(u, ρ, β) ≡ 0 for all (u, β) with ρ held fixed, it then follows from (A.75)
and (A.77) that
0 =
∂H
∂u
du+
∂H
∂β
dβ
⇒ du
dβ
= −∂H/∂β
∂H/∂u
< 0 (A.78)
and hence that the second condition in (2.57) holds. To establish the third con-
dition, observe from (A.71) that
∂H
∂ρ
= (1− u)−
½
−
µ
u+
β
ρ
− 1
¶¡
1− e−X¢
−(1− ρ)
µ
β
ρ2
¶¡
1− e−X¢
+ (1− ρ)
µ
u+
β
ρ
− 1
¶µ
e−X · ∂X
∂ρ
¶¾
= (1− u) +
µ
u+
β
ρ
− 1
¶¡
1− e−X¢
+(1− ρ)
µ
β
ρ2
¶¡
1− e−X +Xe−X¢ (A.79)
and hence from the positivity of u+ β
ρ
− 1 and X that
∂H
∂ρ
> 0 (A.80)
Thus by (A.75) and (A.80) we may now conclude [in a manner similar to (A.78)]
that with β held fixed,
0 =
∂H
∂u
du+
∂H
∂ρ
dρ
⇒ du
dρ
= −∂H/∂ρ
∂H/∂u
> 0 (A.81)
so that the last condition in (2.57) holds.
Next to establish the conditions for β and ρ in (2.58), we now solve for u in
(2.54) and again substitute into (2.55) to obtain the relation:
G(v, ρ, β) = β − ρv − (1− ρ)v £1− e−γse−Y (v,ρ,β)¤ (A.82)
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where
Y (v, ρ, β) =
γs(ρ− β)
ρv
=
γs
v
− γsβ
ρv
(A.83)
The function Y is continuously differentiable in its arguments with
∂Y
∂v
= −Y
v
(A.84)
∂Y
∂ρ
=
γsβ
ρ2v
(A.85)
∂Y
∂β
= −γs
ρv
(A.86)
By using (A.84) we obtain
∂G
∂v
= −ρ− (1− ρ)
½¡
1− e−γse−Y ¢+ ve−γsµe−Y · ∂Y
∂v
¶¾
= −ρ− (1− ρ)©¡1− e−γse−Y ¢− e−γsY e−Y ª
= −ρ− (1− ρ)©1− e−γs(1 + Y )e−Y ª (A.87)
which together with the fact that (1 + Y )e−Y ≤ 1 for all Y , implies that
∂G
∂v
< 0 (A.88)
Moreover, since (A.86) shows that
∂G
∂β
= 1− (1− ρ)v
µ
e−γse−Y · ∂Y
∂β
¶
= 1 + (1− ρ)
µ
γs
ρ
¶
e−γse−Y > 0 (A.89)
it now follows from (A.88) and (A.89) that with ρ held fixed,
0 =
∂G
∂v
dv +
∂G
∂β
dβ
⇒ dv
dβ
= −∂G/∂β
∂G/∂v
> 0 (A.90)
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so that the second condition in (2.58) holds. Finally, to establish the third condi-
tion, observe from (A.85) that
∂G
∂ρ
= −v − (1− ρ)
½
1− e−γse−Y + ve−γse−Y · ∂Y
∂ρ
¾
= −v − (1− ρ)
½¡
1− e−γse−Y ¢+ e−γse−Y · γsβ
ρ2
¾
(A.91)
But since the expression in braces is positive, it then follows that
∂G
∂ρ
< 0 (A.92)
and we may conclude from (A.88) and (A.92) that with β held fixed,
0 =
∂G
∂v
dv +
∂G
∂ρ
dρ
⇒ dv
dρ
= −∂G/∂ρ
∂G/∂v
< 0 (A.93)
Hence the third condition in (2.58) also holds, and the result is established.
A.7. Derivation of (3.22)
Observe from (3.16) that V 00(0) now takes the form:
V 00(0) =
1
1− σ [σ ph(0)V1(0)− α b− σ ph(0)V0 (0)] (A.94)
To evaluate the relevant terms, observe next from (3.15) that
V0 (0) =
b
(1− σ) (A.95)
[which is seen from the identity,
P∞
t=0 σ
t = 1/ (1− σ), to be precisely the dis-
counted lifetime value of permanent unemployment resulting from zero job search].
Next, to evaluate the hiring probability, ph(0), observe from (2.42) that
ph(s) =
v(s)
s u(s)
©
1− e−[γsu(s)/v(s)]ª (A.96)
=
1
w(s)
£
1− e−γw(s)¤
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where w(s) = s u(s)/v(s). But by Theorem 2.2, u(0) = 1 and v(0) = β/ρ > 0, so
that lims→0w(s) = 0, and we may conclude (from an application of l’Hospital’s
rule) that
ph(0) = lims→0 ph(s) = lims→0
1− e−γw(s)
w(s)
(A.97)
= limw→0
1− e−γw
w
= limw→0
γe−γw
1
= γ
[To see the economic meaning of this relation, observe that as population search
intensity falls to zero, all competition for jobs vanishes. Hence the limiting proba-
bility of a being hired is simply the probability of being qualified for a given job].
Finally, noting from (3.7) together with (A.95) that
V1(0) =
µ
1− e1
1− σ
¶
U1 + e1 V0(0) (A.98)
=
µ
1− e1
1− σ
¶
U1 + e1
b
(1− σ) ,
it follows by substituting (A.95), (A.96), and (A.97) into (A.94) that the desired
condition [i.e., positivity of the bracketed term in (A.94)] is given by
0 < σ ph(0)V1(0)− α (1− s)α−1 b− σ ph(0)V0 (0) (A.99)
= σ γ
·µ
1− e1
1− σ
¶
U1 + e1
b
(1− σ)
¸
− α b− σ γ b
(1− σ) .
By employing the definition of e1 in (3.13) and rearranging terms, this inequality
can be rewritten as (3.22).
A.8. Proof of Theorem 3.2
To establish existence of a solution to equations (3.23) through (3.29), we first
show that this system can be reduced to a single equation in search intensity, s,
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as follows. First observe from (3.26) and (3.27) that
V0 = (1− e0) U0(s)
1− σ + e0 V1
=
µ
1− σ
1− σ + σ ph s
¶
U0(s)
1− σ +
µ
σ ph s
1− σ + σ ph s
¶
V1
⇒ (1− σ + σ ph s)V0 = U0(s) + σ ph s V1
⇒ σ ph s (V1 − V0) = (1− σ)V0 − U0(s) (A.100)
Also by (3.27) and (3.28),
V0 = (1− e0) U0(s)
1− σ + e0
·µ
1− e1
1− σ
¶
U1 + e1 V0
¸
⇒ (1− e0 e1)V0 = (1− e0) U0(s)
1− σ + e0 (1− e1)
U1
1− σ
⇒ (1− σ)V0 =
µ
1− e0
1− e0 e1
¶
U0(s) +
µ
e0 (1− e1)
1− e0 e1
¶
U1 , (A.101)
which together with (A.100) implies that
σ ph s (V1 − V0) =
·µ
1− e0
1− e0 e1
¶
U0(s) +
µ
e0 (1− e1)
1− e0 e1
¶
U1
¸
− U0(s)
=
µ
e0 (1− e1)
1− e0 e1
¶
[U1 − U0(s)] . (A.102)
Hence by (3.29) and (A.102),µ
e0 (1− e1)
1− e0 e1
¶
[U1 − U0(s)] = σ ph s (V1 − V0) = s (1− s)α−1b α
=
µ
s
1− s
¶
[(1− s)αb α] =
µ
s
1− s
¶
U0(s)α
⇒ 1
α
µ
1− s
s
¶·
U1 − U0(s)
U0(s)
¸
=
1− e0 e1
e0 (1− e1) , (A.103)
where the left hand side is now seen to be an explicit function of s. Next we show
that the right hand side is an explicit function of the unemployment rate, u. To
do so, observe from (3.25) that
s ph =
µ
ρ
1− ρ
¶
1− u
u
(A.104)
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which together with (3.26) yields
e0 =
σ ρ (1− u)
(1− σ) (1− ρ) u+ σ ρ (1− u) . (A.105)
By substituting (A.105) into the right hand side of (A.103) and reducing, we
obtain
1− e0 e1
e0 (1− e1) =
(1− σ) (1− ρ) u+ σ ρ (1− e1) (1− u)
σ ρ (1− e1) (1− u)
= 1 + µ
µ
u
1− u
¶
(A.106)
where [recalling that e1 = ρ/ (1− σ + σ ρ)] the constant µ is given by
µ =
µ
1− σ
σ
¶µ
1− ρ
ρ
¶
1
1− e1
=
1− σ + σ ρ
σ ρ
> 0 . (A.107)
Thus, letting W (s) be defined for all s ∈ (0, 1] by
W (s) =
1
α
µ
1− s
s
¶·
U1 − U0(s)
U0(s)
¸
− 1
=
1
α
µ
1− s
s
¶·
U1 − (1− s)αb
(1− s)αb
¸
− 1 (A.108)
we see from (A.106) and (A.108) that (A.103) now takes the form, W (s) =
µ [u/ (1− u)], so that u can be written in terms of s as
u =
W (s)
µ+W (s)
. (A.109)
Moreover, by substituting (3.23) and (3.24) into (3.25), we obtain the following
additional equation in s and u :
ρ (1− u) = (1− ρ) u+ a
s u
³
1− e−γs uu+a
´
(A.110)
Thus, letting G (u, s) again be defined as in (A.52), it follows by substituting
(A.109) into (A.110) that this system can be reduced to single equation in s of
the form
G
·
W (s)
µ+W (s)
, s
¸
= 0 (A.111)
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To solve this equation, we next observe that (A.109) is only meaningful for values
of s which yield positive values of u in (A.109) and v in (3.23). It can be shown
(see Lemma A.1 in section A.9 of this Appendix) that for each possible value of
a (i.e., a > −1) there exists a unique search intensity, sa ∈ (0, 1), such that both
these conditions hold iff s ∈ (0, sa). With these observations, the key step in the
proof (established in Lemma A.2 in section A.9 of this Appendix) is to show that
for each a > −1 there exists a unique solution to (A.111) in the open interval
(0, sa).
Given this solution, s, it remains only to show that s generates a unique
set of values [u(s), v(s), ph(s), e0(s), V0(s), V1(s)] which together with s constitute
an endogenous-search equilibrium. To do so, let W (s) be defined by (A.108)
and observe that if u(s) ∈ (0, 1) is in turn defined by (A.109), and if we let
v(s) = u(s) + a, then it follows from the definition of G that (3.23), (3.24) and
(3.25) must hold for these choices, with ph(s) defined by
ph(s) =
v(s)
s u(s)
n
1− e−[γsu(s)v(s) ]
o
(A.112)
In particular, this is seen to imply that [u(s), v(s)] constitutes a steady state given
s, and hence (by Theorem 2.2) that v(s) > 0. Moreover, since ph(s) is of the form,
(1− e−γw) /w, which is seen to satisfy 0 < (1− e−γw) /w < γ < 1 for all w > 0, it
follows that ph(s) ∈ (0, 1). Next let
e0(s) =
σ ph(s) s
1− σ + σ ph(s) s ∈ (0, 1) (A.113)
[so that (3.26) holds] and let V0(s) and V1(s) be defined in terms of (3.8) and (3.9)
by
V0(s) =
1− e0(s)
1− e0(s) e1
µ
U0(s)
1− σ
¶
+
e0(s) (1− e1)
1− e0(s) e1
µ
U1
1− σ
¶
> 0 (A.114)
V1(s) =
1− e1
1− e0(s) e1
µ
U1
1− σ
¶
+
e1 (1− e0(s))
1− e0 (s)e1
µ
U0(s)
1− σ
¶
> 0 (A.115)
so that (3.27) and (3.28) must also hold [by the definitions of (3.8) and (3.9)].
Hence all values [u(s), v(s), ph(s), e0(s), V0(s), V1(s)] are uniquely defined, have
the correct domains, and satisfy conditions (3.23) through (3.28). To see that
the positivity condition (3.29) also holds, observe that since the relations (A.100)
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through (A.102) are independent of (3.29), it follows that these relations must
continue to hold, so that
σ ph(s) s [V1(s)− V0(s)] =
µ
e0(s) (1− e1)
1− e0(s) e1
¶
[U1 − U0(s)] . (A.116)
Finally, since the relations in (A.104) through (A.106) are also independent of
(3.29), it follows from the definition of W (s) that
1
α
µ
1− s
s
¶·
U1 − U0(s)
U0(s)
¸
= 1 +W (s) = 1 + µ
µ
u
1− u
¶
=
1− e0(s) e1
e0(s) (1− e1)
⇒
µ
e0(s) (1− e1)
1− e0(s) e1
¶
[U1 − U0(s)] = α
µ
s
1− s
¶
U0(s)
= α s (1− s)α−1 b , (A.117)
which together with (A.116) [and the positivity of s] is seen to imply that (3.29)
must hold. Thus the vector [s, u(s), v(s), ph(s), e0(s), V0(s), V1(s)] constitutes the
unique endogenous-search equilibrium for these parameters, and the result is es-
tablished.
A.9. Proof of Lemmas A.1 and A.2
If the function g is defined for all s ∈ (0, 1] by
g(s) = G
·
W (s)
µ+W (s)
, s
¸
(A.118)
then to complete the proof of Theorem 3.2 it remains to be shown that g has a
unique root in the open interval (0, sa). To do so, we first show that if
u(s) =
W (s)
µ+W (s)
(A.119)
v(s) = u(s) + a (A.120)
for each s ∈ (0, 1], then
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Lemma A.1. For each a > −1 there exists a unique search intensity, sa ∈ (0, 1),
such that
min{u(s), v(s)} > 0 ⇔ s ∈ (0, sa) (A.121)
Proof. Observe first that if a ≥ 0, then by (A.119) and (A.120)
min {u(s), v(s)} = u(s) > 0 ⇔ W (s) > 0 . (A.122)
On the other hand, if a < 0, then
min {u(s), v(s)} = v(s) > 0 ⇔ u(s) + a > 0
⇔ W (s)
µ+W (s)
+ a > 0
⇔ W (s) > − aµ
(1 + a)
(A.123)
[where 1 + a > 0 by hypothesis]. Hence min{u(s), v(s)} > 0 iff
W (s) > max
½
0,− aµ
(1 + a)
¾
(A.124)
But since (A.108) implies that
lims→0W (s) = lims→0
1
α
µ
1− s
s
¶·
U1 − (1− s)αb
(1− s)αb
¸
− 1 =∞ (A.125)
it follows that (A.124) always holds for values of s near zero. Moreover, since
(A.108) also implies that
W (s) > 0 ⇔ (1− s) [U1 − U0(s)] > αsU0(s)
⇔ (1− s)1−α (U1/b) > 1− s+ α s (A.126)
we see from the positivity of α implies thatW (1) < 0. Hence in the last inequality
of (A.126), the strict concavity of the left-hand side and linearity of the right-hand
side are easily seen to imply that these two terms must be equal at exactly one
intermediate point, s0 ∈ (0, 1), and that (A.126) holds iff s ∈ (0, s0). Next observe
that
W 0(s) =
1
α s2
·
1 +
U1
U0(s)
(α s− 1)
¸
(A.127)
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implies
W 0(s) < 0 ⇔ (1− α s) U1 > U0(s) , (A.128)
Moreover, since
(1− s) [U1 − U0(s)] > αsU0(s)
⇒ (1− s) U1 > (1− s+ α s) U0(s)
⇒ (1− α s) U1 > U0(s) (A.129)
[where the last line follows from the inequality, (1− α s) (1− s+ α s) > 1 − s],
we see from (A.126) through (A.129) that W (s) > 0 ⇒ W 0(s) < 0. Hence W is
strictly decreasing on the interval (0, s0), and it may be concluded that for each
a > −1 there is a unique sa ∈ (0, s0] satisfying W (sa) =max{0,−aµ/ (1 + a)} ≥
0. Finally, since the decreasing monotonicity ofW also implies that (A.124) holds
iff s ∈ (0, sa), we see that sa satisfies (A.121).
Given this admissible range on s, our main result is the following:
Lemma A.2. For each a > −1, the function g has a unique root in the open
interval (0, sa).
Proof. To verify the existence of such root, we first show that it suffices
to establish the following four properties of the function g:
g(0) = 0 (A.130)
g0(0) < 0 (A.131)
lims↑sa g(s) > 0 (A.132)
{s ∈ (0, sa) , g0(s) = 0}⇒ g00(s) > 0 (A.133)
For it will then follow from (A.130) and (A.131) that g(s) < 0 near s = 0,
and from (A.132) that g(s) > 0 near s = sa. Hence by continuity, g must
pass upward through zero at some intermediate point, s∗ ∈ (0, sa), so that in
particular, g0(s∗) ≥ 0. To see that this root must be unique, observe first that
since (A.130) and (A.131) also imply that g is negative on a maximal open
interval (0, sm), it may be assumed that s∗ = sm, i.e., that s∗ is the smallest
root of g in (0, sa). Next observe that since g is continuously differentiable
in (0, sa), it follows from (A.133) that
g0(s∗) > 0 (A.134)
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[for if g0(s∗) = 0, then g00(s∗) > 0 would imply that g0(s) < 0 holds for every
s in some open interval (s∗ − , s∗), and hence that g does not pass upward
through zero at s∗]. Hence if g were to have an additional root, s∗ ∈ (s∗, sa),
then (A.134) [together with the continuity of g] would imply that must
g achieve a (differentiable) maximum at some interior point s ∈ (s∗, s∗).
Finally, since the maximality conditions g0(s) = 0 and g00(s) ≤ 0 would then
contradict (A.133), it follows that no such root can exist, and hence that s∗
is unique. To establish conditions (A.130) through (A.133), we proceed in
order:
Proof of (A.130). Observe from (A.119) and (A.125) that
lims→0W (s) =∞ ⇒ lims→0 u(s) = 1
and hence that
lims→0 g(s) = G [1, 0] = ρ · 0− (1− ρ) (1 + a)
¡
1− e0¢ = 0 . (A.135)
Thus it follows from the continuity of g that (A.130) must hold.
Proof of (A.131). To compute the derivative
g0(s) =
∂G
∂u
· u0(s) + ∂G
∂s
(A.136)
observe first from (A.119) and (A.127) that
u0(s) =
µW 0(s)
[µ+W (s)]2
=
µ
αs2
h
1 + U1
U0(s)
(α s− 1)
i
h
µ+ 1
α
¡
1−s
s
¢ ³
U1−(1−s)αb
(1−s)αb
´
− 1
i2
=
µ
α
h
1 + U1
U0(s)
(α s− 1)
i
h
µ s+
¡
1−s
α
¢ ³U1−(1−s)αb
(1−s)αb
´
− s
i2 (A.137)
Hence U0(0) = b implies that
lims→0 u0(s) =
µ
α
£
1− U1
b
¤£
1
α
¡
U1−b
b
¢¤2 = −µαµ bU1 − b
¶
(A.138)
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Also from (A.62) and (A.66) we see that
∂G
∂u
[u(0), 0] = (1− ρ) e0
µ
1 + a− 0
1 + a
¶
− 1 = −ρ (A.139)
∂G
∂s
[u(0), 0] = − (1− ρ) γ e0 = − (1− ρ) γ (A.140)
Thus, by substituting (A.138) through (A.140) into (A.136), we see that
g0(0) = αρµ
µ
b
U1 − b
¶
− (1− ρ) γ , (A.141)
which together with (A.107) implies that
g0(0) < 0 ⇔ αρµ
µ
b
U1 − b
¶
< (1− ρ) γ
⇔ αρ
·µ
1− ρ
σ ρ
¶
(1− σ + σ ρ)
¸ µ
b
U1 − b
¶
< (1− ρ) γ
⇔ α
σ
(1− σ + σ ρ)
µ
b
U1 − b
¶
< γ
⇔ U1 − b > α
σ
(1− σ + σ ρ) b (A.142)
But by the positivity condition (3.22) it follows that
U1 − b > α
σ
µ
1− σ + σ ρ
1− ρ
¶
b >
α
σ
(1− σ + σ ρ) b , (A.143)
and thus that (A.131) must hold.
Proof of (A.132). Suppose first that a ≥ 0 (so that by definition sa = s0),
and observe from (A.108) and (A.119) that
lims↑s0 W (s) = 0 ⇒ lims↑s0u(s) = 0 (A.144)
Hence from (A.118) together with (A.52) we see that
lims↑s0 g(s) = ρ− (1− ρ) a
¡
1− e0¢ = ρ > 0 (A.145)
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Next suppose that a < 0. In this case, (A.108), (A.119), and (A.123) imply that
lims↑sa W (s) = −
aµ
1 + a
⇒ lims↑sa u(s) = u(sa) = −a
⇒ lims↑sa v(s) = 0 , (A.146)
which together with 1 + a > 0, allows us to conclude that
lims↑sa g(s) = ρ (1 + a)− (1− ρ) (0)
¡
1− e−∞¢
= ρ (1 + a) > 0 (A.147)
Hence we see that (A.132) holds in all cases, and it remains only to establish
(A.133).
Proof of (A.133). To establish this key property, we first introduce the
following simplifying notation. For all s ∈ (0, sa) let
L(s) =
u(s)
u(s) + a
=
W (s)
a (µ+W (s)) +W (s)
=
W (s)
( 1 + a)W (s) + aµ
(A.148)
and [recalling (A.62) and (A.66)] let
M(s) ≡ ∂G
∂u
[u(s), s] = (1− ρ) e−γs u(s)u(s)+a
µ
u(s) + a− γsa
u(s) + a
¶
− 1
= (1− ρ) e−γsL(s) [1− γ s+ γ sL(s)]− 1 (A.149)
Q(s) ≡ ∂G
∂s
[u(s), s] = − (1− ρ) γ u(s) e−γs u(s)u(s)+a
= − (1− ρ) γ u(s) e−γsL(s) (A.150)
With this notation, it follows (by dropping functional dependencies on s) that
g0 =M u0 +Q (A.151)
and hence that
g00 =M u00 +M 0 u0 +Q0 . (A.152)
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To evaluate the first term of (A.152), observe first from (A.151) together with
(A.137) and (A.150) that g0 = 0 iff
M = −Q/u0
=
(µ+W )2
µW 0
·
(1− ρ) γ
µ
W
µ+W
¶
e−γsL
¸
(A.153)
Next observe from (A.137) that
u00 =
d
ds
·
µW 0
(µ+W )2
¸
=
µ
(µ+W )2
Ã
W 00 − 2 (W
0)2
µ+W
!
(A.154)
and hence (after some reduction) that
M u00 = (1− ρ) γ e−γ sL
µ
W
µ+W
¶·
W 00
W 0
− 2W
0
µ+W
¸
(A.155)
To evaluate the second term of (A.152), observe from (A.149) that
M 0 = − (1− ρ) γ e−γ sL [1− γ s (1− L) (L+ sL0)] (A.156)
which together with (A.137) yields
M 0 u0 = − (1− ρ) γ e−γ sL [1− γ sL (1− L) (L+ sL0)]
½
µW 0
(µ+W )2
¾
(A.157)
To evaluate the last term of (A.152), observe first from (A.150) that
Q0 = − (1− ρ) γ d
ds
·
W
µ+W
e−γ sL
¸
= − (1− ρ) γ e−γ sL
·
µW 0
(µ+W )2
− γ
µ
W
µ+W
¶
(L+ sL0)
¸
,
But since (A.148) implies
L0 =
d
ds
·
W
( 1 + a)W + aµ
¸
=
aµW 0
[( 1 + a)W + aµ]2
, (A.158)
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it follows (after some reduction) that
Q0 = − (1− ρ) γ e−γ sL
½
µW 0
(µ+W )2
[1− γ sL (1− L)]− γ
µ
W
µ+W
¶
L
¾
(A.159)
Hence, combining (A.155), (A.157), (A.159), factoring out the (positive) com-
mon term, (1− ρ) γ e−γ sL/ (µ+W ), and simplifying, it follows from (A.152) that
when g0 = 0, we have g00 > 0 iff
0 < W
·
W 00
W 0
− 2W
0
µ+W
¸
+ γ W L
−
µ
µW 0
µ+W
¶©
2 [1− γ sL (1− L)]− γ s2 (1− L) L0ª (A.160)
To reduce (A.160) further, we next use (A.127) together with the identity, U 00/U0 =
−b/ (1− s), to evaluate
W 00 =
d
ds
½
1
α s2
·
1 +
U1
U0
(α s− 1)
¸¾
=
1
α s3
½
−2 + U1
U0
·
2− α s
µ
1 +
1− α s
1− s
¶¸¾
(A.161)
Then, after some manipulation, the ratio, W 00/W 0, reduces to
W 00
W 0
=
αsU1 (1− α)
(1− s) [(1− α s)U1 − U0] −
2
s
, (A.162)
Upon substituting (A.162) into (A.160), dividing through by 2W /s > 0, and
rearranging terms, we obtain the equivalent condition
1 <
µ
−W
0
W
s
¶µ
W + µ [1− γ sL (1− L)]
W + µ
¶
+
γ sL
2
½µ
µ
µ+W
¶µ
W 0
W
¶µ
L0
L
¶
s2 (1− L) + 1
¾
+
1
2
µ
s
1− s
¶·
U1 sα (1− α)
U1 (1− α s)− U0
¸
(A.163)
To simplify this condition further, recall from (A.129) that (1− α s) U1 > U0(s)
for all s ∈ (0, sa), and hence that the last term in (A.163) is always positive.
67
Hence it suffices to show that
1 <
µ
−W
0
W
s
¶µ
W + µ [1− γ sL (1− L)]
µ+W
¶
+
γ sL
2
½µ
µ
µ+W
¶µ
W 0
W
¶µ
L0
L
¶
s2 (1− L) + 1
¾
(A.164)
The second term in (A.164) can be simplified by observing from (A.148) that
L0 =
aµW 0
[(1 + a)W + aµ]2
⇒ L
0
L
=
aµ
(1 + a)W + aµ
µ
W 0
W
¶
(A.165)
and in addition, from (A.108) and (A.127) that
W 0
W
=
1
α s2
h
1 + U1
U0
(α s− 1)
i
1
α
¡
1−s
s
¢ ³
U1−U0
U0
´
− 1
=
1
s
[U0 + U1 (α s− 1)]
(1− s) (U1 − U0)− α sU0 (A.166)
By using these results, and letting
R = −sW
0
W
=
(1− α s) U1 − U0
(1− s) (U1 − U0)− αsU0 , (A.167)
we can rewrite the right hand side of (A.164) as
R
·
(W + µ)− µγ sL (1− L)
W + µ
¸
+
γ sL
2
½µ
µ
µ+W
¶
R2
µ
aµ
(1 + a)W + aµ
¶
(1− L) + 1
¾
= R
·
1− s γ
µ
µ
W + µ
¶
L (1− L)
¸
+
γ sL
2
µ
µ
µ+W
¶
R2
µ
aµ
(1 + a)W + aµ
¶
(1− L) + γ sL
2
(A.168)
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so that condition (A.164) becomes
1 < R
·
1− s γ
µ
µ
µ+W
¶
L (1− L)
¸
+
γ sL
2
µ
µ
µ+W
¶
R2
·
aµ
(1 + a)W + aµ
¸
(1− L) + γ sL
2
(A.169)
We next show that R(s) > 1 for all s ∈ (0, sa). To do so, recall from (A.129) that
(1− α s) U1−U0 > 0, and hence [again from the inequality (1− α s) (1− s+ α s) >
1− s and positivity of (1− s+ α s)] that
(1− α s) U1 − U0 > (1− s+ α s) [(1− α s) U1 − U0]
> (1− s) U1 − (1− s+ α s) U0
= (1− s) (U1 − U0)− α sU0 (A.170)
Thus by (A.167) we see that R > 1 on (0, sa). To use this result, we next
show that both the terms in on the right hand side of (A.169) involving R are
always nonnegative. To establish nonnegativity of the first term, observe first
that if a ≥ 0, then by (A.148) it follows that L(s) ∈ [0, 1], and hence that
L (1− L) ∈ [0, 1/4]. This together with s γ [µ/ (µ+W )] ∈ (0, 1) implies that
the bracketed expression in the first term is positive. Next, if a < 0, observe
again from (A.148) that L(s) > 1, and hence that L (1− L) < 0, so that the
bracketed expression is again positive. Hence R > 1 implies that the first term is
in fact positive. Turning to the second term, we need only consider the product,
A · (1− L), with A = aµ/ [(1 + a)W + aµ]. Again if a ≥ 0, then both A and
(1− L) are nonnegative, so that their product is also. Finally, if a < 0, then since
the definition of sa implies from (A.124) that W (s) > −aµ (1− a) and hence
that (1 + a)W + aµ > 0, it now follows that both A and (1− L) are negative,
and again have a nonnegative product. Given these nonnegativity properties, it
thus suffices to establish (A.169) with R replaced by one, which (after regrouping
terms) is equivalent to showing that
1 < 1− s γ
µ
µ
µ+W
¶
L (1− L)
·
1− 1
2
µ
aµ
(1 + a)W + aµ
¶¸
+
γ sL
2
(A.171)
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By subtracting one, then dividing by − (γ sL), and using (A.148), this reduces
to:
1
2
>
µ
µ
µ+W
¶
(1− L)
·
1− 1
2
µ
aµ
(1 + a)W + aµ
¶¸
=
µ
aµ
(1 + a)W + aµ
¶·
1− 1
2
µ
aµ
(1 + a)W + aµ
¶¸
(A.172)
Finally, letting x = aµ/ [(1 + a)W + aµ] < 1, and observing that
(1− x)2 = 1− 2x+ x2 > 0
⇒ 1 > 2x− x2
⇒ 1
2
> x
µ
1− 1
2
x
¶
(A.173)
we may conclude that (A.172) holds, and hence that the result is established.
A.10. Monotonicity of Search Intensity in Wages
To show that s0(w) > 0 for all wage levels, w, we first write g explicitly as a
function of w, i.e., g(s, w), and observe from the definition of s(w) that
0 ≡ g[s(w), w] = G{u[s(w), w], s(w)} (A.174)
Hence we must have
0 ≡ d
dw
g[s(w), w] =
d
dw
G{u[s(w), w], s(w)}
=
∂G
∂u
½
∂u
∂s
s0(w) +
∂u
∂w
¾
+
∂G
∂s
s0(w)
= s0(w)
·
∂G
∂u
∂u
∂s
+
∂G
∂s
¸
s(w)
+
·
∂G
∂u
∂u
∂w
¸
s(w)
(A.175)
and may write s0(w) as
s0(w) = −
£
∂G
∂u
∂u
∂w
¤
s(w)£
∂G
∂u
∂u
∂s
+ ∂G
∂s
¤
s(w)
(A.176)
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To establish positivity of (A.176) we first recall from (A.137) together with the
proof of Lemma A.1 that
W [s(w)] > 0 ⇒ W 0[s(w)] > 0
⇒
·
∂u
∂w
¸
s(w)
> 0 (A.177)
Moreover, since the proof of Theorem 2.2 showed that u[s(w), w] ∈ (ua, 1), it
also follows from (A.60) that [∂G/∂u]s(w) < 0, and hence from (A.177) that the
numerator of (A.176) is negative. Thus it remains to show that the denominator
of (A.177) is positive. But by setting s∗ = s(w) in proof of Lemma A.1, we see
from (A.134) that
0 < g0(s∗) = g0[s(w)] =
·
∂G
∂u
∂u
∂s
+
∂G
∂s
¸
s(w)
(A.178)
and hence that s0(w) > 0.
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